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1573 
The Law of Presidential Transitions  
and the 2000 Election 
Todd J. Zywicki ∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The presidential election of 2000 raised a number of unprece-
dented legal and political issues. Among those were the issues raised 
by the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (the “Act”), a heretofore 
obscure statute that took on massive importance in both the political 
framework of the election as well as the practical framework of 
George W. Bush’s efforts to effectuate a smooth presidential transi-
tion.1 Like so many other issues raised by the election fall-out, the 
issues raised by the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 presented le-
gal issues of first impression and crucial political questions. Fought 
against the backdrop of the contentious presidential election and the 
legal and public relations battles that swirled around it, the issues of 
the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 took on profound impor-
tance. Unlike other issues raised by the election that are likely to 
prove unique to the 2000 election, the issues surrounding the law of 
presidential transitions are likely to arise again in the future, espe-
cially because the way in which the Act was implemented raises sub-
stantial concerns of future mischief. 
 
 ∗ Visiting Professor, Boston College Law School; Associate Professor of Law, George 
Mason University School of Law; Senior Research Fellow, James Buchanan Center Program 
on Markets and Institutions. The author testified on the Presidential Transition Act before the 
House of Representatives Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and 
Technology of the Committee on Government Reform on December 4, 2000. The author 
would like to thank Alex Azar and Michael Abramowicz for their comments on this article, 
Michael Klarman and Kimberly M. Zywicki for insightful conversations related to the article, 
the Law & Economics Center at George Mason University School of Law for financial sup-
port, and the state of Florida for generating many interesting legal issues during the 2000 elec-
tion. I would also like to thank the staff of the George Mason Law Library, especially Meghan 
McGee and Iva Futrell, for their assistance in locating many of the obscure historical sources 
referred to in this article, and Kai Yu, Boston College Law School Class of 2003, for excellent 
research assistance. 
 1. Presidential Transition Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-277, 78 Stat. 153 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 3 U.S.C. (1994))  [hereinafter Presidential Transition Act]. 
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The facts surrounding the 2000 presidential election are well 
known. On the night of the general election, the Republican ticket 
of George W. Bush and Richard Cheney claimed victory in the presi-
dential election on the basis of a narrow victory in Florida. When 
combined with the other states claimed by Bush and Cheney, Flor-
ida’s electoral votes gave them 271 votes, one more than necessary 
to claim the White House. Democratic rivals Albert Gore and Joseph 
Lieberman refused to concede the election and instead contested the 
Bush victory in Florida, initiated litigation, and requested recounts of 
various ballots in Florida. As a result of the narrowness of the Bush 
lead and the complexity of the litigation and recount issues, the elec-
tion’s final outcome remained in the balance for several weeks. The 
election was not finally settled until early December, when the Su-
preme Court ruled in favor of Bush in the case of Bush v. Gore.2 The 
next day Gore conceded the election to Bush. 
In most presidential elections, the outcome of the election is 
known the day after the general election. The President-elect has 
only seventy-three days from the election date in November and the 
President’s inauguration on January 20 of the following year to ap-
point senior policy analysts, prepare a budget for presentation to 
Congress, and begin making legislative priorities.3 Given the massive 
scope of the transition responsibilities and the relatively short time 
frame to conduct those activities, every day during the transition pe-
riod is crucial. In fact, it usually takes several months into the Presi-
dent’s term to complete the “transition” and to fill all of the neces-
sary personnel appointments. 
Before 1963, presidential transitions primarily were staffed by 
volunteers and funded by the political party of the incoming Presi-
dent.4 In order to ease the difficulties of conducting a presidential 
transition, Congress enacted the Act. The Act provides a variety of 
resources for office space, staff compensation, communications ser-
vices, and printing and postage costs associated to be made available 
for the presidential transition (collectively, the “transition resources” 
or “transition funds”).5 The General Services Administration 
 
 2. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 3. See Review & Outlook, Editorial, The Politics of Transition, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 
2000, at A22, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 26619058. 
 4. See Stephanie Smith, Presidential Transitions 1960–2001, CRS REPORT FOR 
CONGRESS (Nov. 7, 2000). 
 5. Presidential Transition Act, supra note 1,  § 3(a). 
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(“GSA”) is the federal agency assigned to administering the funds 
and office space allocated for the presidential transition. For fiscal 
year 2001, the GSA was authorized a total of $7.1 million for the 
upcoming transition: $1.83 million for the outgoing Clinton admini-
stration; and a total of approximately $5.3 million for the incoming 
administration, including $1 million appropriated under the 2000 
amendments contained in the Presidential Transition Act of 2000. 
The Administrator of the GSA (the “Administrator”) is the individ-
ual responsible for dispersing the money appropriated for the transi-
tion as well as executing the responsibilities of fitting the office for 
operation. The President appoints the GSA Administrator. 
Following the certification of Florida’s electoral votes in Novem-
ber 2000, George W. Bush and Richard Cheney requested that the 
Administrator, Clinton appointee David J. Barram, order the release 
of the resources allocated to be made available for the incoming ad-
ministration, including the office space allocated to the transition as 
well as the funds appropriated for the transition. Under the terms of 
the statute, the Administrator is instructed to release the transition 
resources upon the request of the “President-elect.”6 The “Presi-
dent-elect” and “Vice-President-elect” are defined by the Act as 
“such persons as are the apparent successful candidates for the office 
of President and Vice President, respectively, as ascertained by the 
Administrator following the general elections held to determine the 
electors of President and Vice President in accordance with title 3, 
United States Code, sections 1 and 2.”7 The phrase “apparent suc-
cessful candidates” is not defined in the Act. 
The Administrator refused to release the funds to any incoming 
administration on the ground that he was unable to ascertain an 
“apparent successful candidate” in the election. In fact, the Adminis-
trator took no action to release the funds or the office space until af-
ter Al Gore conceded the election on December 13. Throughout 
this period, the Administrator refused to articulate any specific stan-
dard that he would use to make the determination. During this pe-
riod he offered at least three different and mutually contradictory in-
terpretations of the Act to justify his inaction. Initially he indicated 
that he would release the transition resources as soon as a candidate 
was certified as having received a majority of electoral votes in the 
 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. § 3(c). 
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election, stating that he would release the transition funds and the 
keys to the transition office “to whichever candidate garnered the 
necessary 270 electoral votes after Florida’s outcome was certified.”8 
In the face of the Florida recount imbroglio and under political pres-
sure from the White House, he quickly amended his position. Al-
though he refused to articulate any express standard, he later sug-
gested he would consider two other criteria as especially important. 
These two criteria were: (1) a concession by one of the candidates,9 
and/or (2) a resolution of all election contests and all election-
related litigation.10 At the same time he apparently repudiated his 
earlier position that the certification of an electoral college winner 
was even a relevant criterion. He provided no explanation as to why 
he considered those two factors to be especially relevant or why the 
certification of an electoral college winner would not be relevant. 
Nor did he ever declare whether these two criteria were disjunctive 
or conjunctive, or whether one was more important than the other. 
In fact, the Administrator vacillated throughout the entire post-
election period, referring to the need for a concession at some times, 
the need for a resolution to election contests at other times, and a 
need for both a concession and a resolution to election contests at 
still other times. To the extent that a resolution of election contro-
versies was required, he never stated whether this necessitated a final 
 
 8. George Archibald, White House Puts Transition on Hold: Agencies Told to Await 
Definite Winner, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2000, at A3, available at 2000 WL 4170334 [here-
inafter Archibald, White House Puts Transition on Hold]; see also George Archibald, Bush 
Won’t Get Keys to Transition Office Yet, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2000, at A1, available at 
2000 WL 4170176 [hereinafter Archibald, Bush Won’t Get Keys] (announcing that the offices 
were ready and that he was ready to turn over the keys to the president-elect). 
 9. Archibald, Bush Won’t Get Keys, supra note 8. 
 10. On November 27, the GSA released a statement that the election results were still 
not clear, despite the Florida vote certification. See George Archibald, House Leaders Seek 
Reasons for Denial of Transition Funds, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2000, at A1. The statement 
read, “Today, both sides are continuing with their stated plans to seek legal remedies with re-
spect to this election so the outcome remains unclear and unapparent.” Id.; see also Esther 
Schrader, Transition Agency All Dressed Up, Nowhere to Go, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 
Nov. 10, 2000, at A10, available at 2000 WL 27783932 (quoting GSA Deputy Administrator 
Thurman Davis, “We’ll make the call on handing over the offices whenever the determination 
is made on who is going to be president. If we get lawsuits, we cannot know who the winner 
is. We won’t know. We’ll just have to wait.”); George Archibald, Congress Attempts to Speed 
Transition: Money Would Go to Both Candidates, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2000, at A8, avail-
able at 2000 WL 4171257 [hereinafter Archibald, Congress Attempts to Speed Transition]; 
Associated Press, Transition Funds Remain in Limbo, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 27, 2000, at 13 (quot-
ing GSA spokeswoman Beth Newburger, “As long as both sides are still going to court, and 
both sides say they are, we believe that the outcome remains unclear.”). 
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resolution or whether he was empowered to use his judgment to de-
clare the contests effectively concluded.11 
Finally, in the waning days of the controversy he adopted a third 
position, that he was actually forbidden by the Act from releasing the 
transition resources in a “close” election while the final results re-
mained in doubt.12 He made no attempt to square this position with 
his previous positions.13 To the extent that any consistency could be 
gleaned from these multiple twists and turns, it appears that the Ad-
ministrator believed that he had the sole discretion to interpret the 
terms of the Act and the conditions under which the Act’s release of 
funds was triggered, and that he could make the factual determina-
tions required by the Act according to his plenary and unreviewable 
subjective assessment of the facts of the situation. 
Finally, on December 12, the Supreme Court put an end to all 
further election-related litigation in Florida in Bush v. Gore. Still, the 
Administrator refused to act, stating that he awaited a concession 
speech by Vice-President Al Gore.14 Following Gore’s concession in 
a nationally-televised speech, on December 13 the Administrator fi-
nally released the transition funds and turned over the keys to the 
transition offices to George W. Bush and Richard Cheney.15 Even at 
this point the Administrator still never articulated why he waited for 
an express concession rather than simply acting after the Supreme 
Court’s ruling that resolved the relevant litigation. This substantially 
delayed Bush’s transition, including the initiation of the appoint-
ments process and background checks on potential appointees.16 
 
 11. As will be shown infra this distinction is crucial, as the Administrator’s refusal to 
recognize Bush as the President-elect on the facts of the 2000 election appears to have been 
based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the law governing presidential elections. 
 12. House Legislators Debate Allocation of Transition Funds, CONGRESS DAILY, Dec. 
4, 2000, available at 2000 WL 27012859 (statement of GSA that “Congress made it perfectly 
clear that if there is ‘any question’ of who the winner is ‘in a close contest,’” then the GSA 
should not declare a winner). 
 13. See Hearing Before the House Comm. on Gov’t Reform, Subcomm. on Gov’t 
Mgmt., Info., and Tech., and the U.S. House of Representatives (Dec. 4, 2000) (statement of 
David J. Barram, Administrator of General Services) [hereinafter Barram Testimony]. 
 14. See Kirsten Danis, Bush Bounding into Winner’s Circle—Ready to Head for D.C. 
with Olive Branch for Al, N.Y. POST, Dec. 14, 2000, at 4, available at 2000 WL 30249971; 
see also R.A. Dyer, Bush-Cheney Transition Team Shifts into High Gear, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, Dec. 14, 2000, at 27, available at 2000 WL 28294001. 
 15. See Associated Press, Officials Release Funding to Bush, DENV. POST, Dec. 14, 
2000, at A21, available at 2000 WL 25837300. 
 16. See Welcome to 1600 Pennsylvania Ave., Mr. Bush, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2000, 
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The effect of this delay placed a heavy burden on the Bush-
Cheney transition team. On one hand, they could have deferred their 
transition efforts indefinitely, until the Administrator decided to re-
lease the funds. On the other hand, they could rely solely on private 
funding for their transition, a result that the framers of the Act spe-
cifically sought to avoid.17 In the end, they chose the latter option, 
although they erected substantial safeguards to prevent conflicts of 
interest and the appearance of impropriety.18 Either way, the Admin-
istrator’s denial of the transition resources heavily prejudiced the 
Bush transition efforts, cutting the official transition period in half 
and forcing Bush to rely for several weeks on purely private funds to 
effect his transition. 
This essay argues that under the facts of the 2000 presidential 
election, the Administrator had no statutory authority to withhold 
the transition resources and that, as a result, the prejudice imposed 
upon the Bush transition effort was wholly unjustified.19 This essay 
will explore the language, intent, and policy goals of the Act, con-
cluding that under the facts of the 2000 presidential election, the 
Administrator was required to release the transition resources once 
Bush received a majority of pledged and certified electoral college 
votes. Although the Act vests the Administrator with some discre-
tion, this discretion is limited to making a narrow finding of fact and 
is heavily circumscribed by the history and language of the Act. The 
discretion accorded by the Act is far narrower than that seized by the 
Administrator in the 2000 election. Moreover, this essay will show 
that the basis claimed by the Administrator to justify his interpreta-
tion of the statute rested on a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
statute and the legislative history. The Administrator acted lawlessly 
and irresponsibly throughout the entire dispute, prejudicing the 
Bush-Cheney transition and harming the country as a result. 
The essay addresses the various arguments advanced by the Ad-
ministrator to justify his refusal to release the transition resources to 
Bush prior to Al Gore’s concession on December 13. Part II reviews 
the Administrator’s initial justification that the language of the Act is 
 
at A18. 
 17. See infra notes 183–186 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra note 186. 
 19. See infra notes 176–186 and accompanying text (describing harm to Bush transi-
tion, including delay in beginning transition and creating need to rely on private funds to fund 
transition activities). 
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ambiguous and his implicit assertion of authority to render an au-
thoritative legal interpretation of the Act that provided him with dis-
cretion to refuse to release the transition resources to Bush. A close 
reading of the Act’s language shows it to be unambiguous in its 
terms, at least on the facts of the 2000 election. Part II will further 
show that even if the Act is thought to be ambiguous, the Adminis-
trator acted improperly in his interpretation of the Act. Part III re-
views the legislative history and the political context of the Act. The 
legislative history reinforces the plain language reading of the Act, 
and the historical context of the Act also provides important context 
for understanding the debates over the Act. Part IV reviews the spe-
cific legislative history relied on by the Administrator to deny the re-
lease of the transition resources to Bush, and shows that the Admin-
istrator’s understanding of this legislative history was flawed. Part V 
reviews the policies of the Act and demonstrates that requiring the 
Administrator to release the funds as soon as Bush received a major-
ity of pledged and certified electoral votes was more consistent with 
the policies of the Act than allowing the Administrator untrammeled 
discretion to withhold the funds until he is subjectively satisfied that 
the apparent winner could be recognized. Part VI of the essay briefly 
discusses proposals for reforming the Act to prevent another debacle 
like that of the 2000 election. Part VII concludes. 
II. THE SCOPE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR’S DISCRETION 
The Administrator’s initial position was that the language of the 
Act was ambiguous and that he was therefore empowered to exercise 
discretion in construing the Act’s terms. Although the Administrator 
never formally articulated a justification for his authority, his position 
presumably was rooted in the logic of the so-called Chevron doc-
trine.20 Assuming that this doctrine was the basis for his claimed au-
thority, this Part of the essay shows that the Administrator’s acts 
were not protected by Chevron; nor is it even clear that Chevron 
would even apply to this case. Under Chevron, if a statute is unam-
biguous, then it is to be applied according to its terms and no discre-
tion is owed to the agency asserting authority. This essay shows that 
the Act is unambiguous, at least in relevant part and as it relates to 
this case. But even if the statutory language is ambiguous, the Ad-
 
 20. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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ministrator’s interpretation should be reviewed under the less-
deferential standard of review of Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,21 rather 
than Chevron. Under the Skidmore standard, the Administrator’s 
decisions were entitled to very little deference at all. Finally, even if 
Chevron does apply to this situation, the Administrator’s refusal to 
release the transition resources once Bush received a majority of 
pledged and certified electoral college votes represented an unrea-
sonable interpretation of the statute and was thus not protected by 
any discretion that he may have otherwise been allowed to exercise. 
Under Chevron, a court must apply a two-step process to deter-
mine the determination of whether a court should defer to an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute.22 Under the first step of the 
Chevron analysis, a court must determine whether Congress in-
tended to delegate law-making authority to the administrative 
agency claiming the power to regulate. Resolving this first prong will 
require the court to resolve two additional intertwined issues. Ini-
tially, the court must determine whether the language of the statute 
unambiguously resolves the question; if so, then Congress can be 
understood to have already exercised its law-making authority. If the 
statute is ambiguous, the court must determine whether Congress 
intended for the agency to fill the ambiguity by delegating law-
making authority to that agency, or whether Congress intended for 
the gap to be filled by judicial interpretation, looking to agency in-
terpretations for persuasive (not binding) guidance as to the meaning 
of the statute. 
Under the second step of Chevron, if there is ambiguity in the 
statute and it is evident that Congress intended for the agency to is-
sue an authoritative interpretation of the statute, then the court 
should defer to any reasonable, authoritative interpretation of the 
statute’s command. However, the second prong in the Chevron 
analysis is relevant only if the statutory language is found to be am-
biguous or that Congress intended to delegate authority to the 
administrative agent to engage in law-making activity. 
This Part will apply the Chevron analysis to determine whether 
the Administrator acted appropriately in refusing to release the tran-
sition funds to Bush-Cheney once it secured a majority of pledged 
and certified electoral votes. As will be shown, under the plain lan-
 
 21. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 22. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
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guage of the Act, the Administrator was required as a matter of law 
to release the transition resources once Bush received a majority of 
certified electoral college votes. Furthermore, even if it is believed 
that the Administrator was not compelled as a matter of law, on the 
facts of the 2000 election there was no reasonable basis for the Ad-
ministrator to refuse to release the transition resources to Bush. Even 
if it is believed that the Act is ambiguous and that therefore the Ad-
ministrator held some discretion, the discretion intended for the 
Administrator to exercise is limited to making a narrow factual find-
ing, not sweeping legal interpretations. Finally, it will be shown that 
given the legal and factual determinations made here, along with the 
absence of formal procedures to guide his decision-making, the Ad-
ministrator’s actions should be governed under the less-deferential 
Skidmore standard, rather than Chevron. 
A. Plain Language 
Section 3 of the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 authorizes 
the Administrator, upon request, to provide to the President and 
Vice-President-elect “necessary services and facilities” to effectuate 
the transition of the President-elect to become President.23 The de-
bate centered on the statutory definition provided in subsection (c) 
of the Act, which provides: 
The terms “President-elect” and “Vice-President elect” as used in 
this Act shall mean such persons as are the apparent successful can-
didates for the office of President and Vice President, respectively, 
as ascertained by the Administrator following the general elections 
held to determine the electors of President and Vice President in 
accordance with title 3, United States Code, sections 1 and 2.24 
The crucial question to be resolved in implementing the Act, 
therefore, is when does a candidate qualify as the “apparent” winner 
of the election, so as to be designated as the “President-elect” under 
the statute. 
1. Legal significance of a certified electoral college majority 
The Act does not define the phrase “apparent successful candi-
dates,” but the plain language of the statute and standard principles 
 
 23. Presidential Transition Act, supra note 1, § 3(a). 
 24. Id. § 3(c) (emphasis added). 
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of statutory construction provide some evidence of the statute’s 
meaning. For instance, the term “apparent” is defined in Webster’s 
Dictionary as “appearing (but not necessarily) real or true,”25 and 
therefore its use in the statute indicates a distinction between the 
“apparent” and “real” winners of the election. The use of the term 
apparent successful candidate makes it evident that the recipient of 
the funds need not be the officially designated, actually successful 
candidate, and since its enactment the Act has never been construed 
to require that the apparent successful candidate prove that he is the 
actual successful candidate. 
In fact, the Act contemplates and permits payment of obligations 
incurred as early as the day after the general election if an apparent 
successful candidate can be identified.26 The actual successful candi-
date, of course, could not be identified until the final counting of the 
electoral college ballots in January. Clearly then, the statutory lan-
guage indicates that the use of the term “apparent” means some-
thing distinct from the “actual” or official winning candidate. 
The Administrator presumably believed that the relevant terms in 
the Act were ambiguous, giving him discretion to refuse to declare 
Bush the apparent winner. But read in context, the term is not suffi-
ciently ambiguous to support the Administrator’s proffered reading 
of the statute. In the interpretation of a statute, a reviewing “court, 
as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress.”27 If Congress has expressed its intent 
unambiguously, “the inquiry is at an end” and the agency interpreta-
tion must yield to the statute.28 
Statutory language must not be read in isolation, but in the 
overall context of the statute. As the Supreme Court recently ob-
served in FDA v. Brown & Williamson, “A court must therefore in-
terpret the statute ‘as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme’ 
and ‘fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious whole.’”29 Thus, it is 
 
 25. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE (2d college 
ed., David B. Guralnik et al. eds., 1982). Other definitions of “apparent” arguably suggest a 
tighter link between what is real and what is perceived, as Webster’s offers as alternatives “read-
ily seen; visible” and “readily understood or perceived; evident.” Id. But these definitions still 
distinguish between perception and underlying reality. 
 26. Presidential Transition Act, supra note 1, § 3(b). 
 27. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 28. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000). 
 29. Id. at 133 (citations omitted). 
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not enough to simply ask whether any ambiguity in the statute exists. 
Rather, the proper inquiry is whether the statutory language, read in 
context and assuming a reasonable connection between the language 
and purposes of the statute, produces an unambiguous result.30 
The relevant question in this situation is whether under the plain 
language of the statute the GSA Administrator was required to name 
Bush “President-elect” under the Act once he secured a majority of 
certified electors in the election. Following the certification of the 
Florida popular vote on November 26, 2000, by the Florida Secre-
tary of State in favor of Bush-Cheney, the Governor of Florida exe-
cuted and forwarded to the National Archives the Certificate of As-
certainment designating the Bush-Cheney slate of electors as 
Florida’s electors.31 When combined with the certified and pledged 
electors of other states, this guaranteed Bush-Cheney 271 electoral 
votes, a number sufficient to have them elected President and Vice-
President, respectively. 
By using the term “apparent” Congress recognized the possibil-
ity that some contingency might intervene that caused a situation 
where the “apparent winning candidate” did not, in fact, turn out to 
be the actual winning candidate. This could be for any number of 
reasons, including the death of the President-elect during the transi-
tion period,32 electoral fraud overturning an election,33 resignation of 
a candidate,34 ballot recounts that change the result after the initial 
 
 30. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 23 (1997) (“A text should not be con-
strued strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to 
contain all that it fairly means.”). 
 31. See http://www.nara.gov/fedreg/elctcoll/2000certa.html (reproducing Certifi-
cates of Attainment in PDF format). 
 32. In 1873, Georgia’s electors were pledged to Horace Greeley, who died between the 
day of the election and the day the Electors met to cast their votes. Despite Greeley’s passing, 
three Georgia electors persisted in voting for him. There was an objection to the counting of 
these electoral votes on this basis, and eventually the votes were disallowed. See 3 ASHER C. 
HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 1967, at 270 (1907). 
 33. In the 1877 election, conflicting electoral certificates were presented from Florida, 
requiring a determination of which slate of electors would be counted. See id. § 1971, at 274–
76. 
 34. In an analogous situation, in 1972, Senator Thomas Eagleton resigned as the Vice-
Presidential nominee for the Democratic Party following the convention. See Kevin J. Cole-
man et al., Presidential Elections in the United States: A Primer, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, 
at CRS-46 (April 17, 2000). 
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general election,35 or a “faithless” elector who violates his pledge and 
votes for a candidate different from the one for whom he promised 
to vote.36 The drafters of the Act specifically considered the possibil-
ity of faithless electors and the fact that faithless electors could upset 
the final recognition of the apparent winner as the actual winner. Ac-
knowledging that this was a possibility in every presidential election, 
the drafters of the Act nonetheless agreed that this possibility would 
not provide a basis for refusing to recognize the pledged electors in 
ascertaining an apparent winner.37 Any of these contingencies could 
occur in any presidential election, and, in fact, have actually occurred 
in prior elections. However, there is no reason to believe that the 
possibility that they may arise again should interfere with making the 
designation of an apparent successful candidate when one can be 
identified. 
The plain language of the Act also clearly limits the Administra-
tor’s discretion in naming the President-elect. Thus, the plain lan-
guage of the Act forecloses the Administrator from naming Ralph 
Nader of the Green Party or Harry Browne of the Libertarian Party 
as the “apparent successful candidate.” Although one could imagine 
scenarios where one of these candidates ended up winning an elec-
toral college majority when the balloting actually occurred, the Ad-
ministrator clearly could not name either of them as the apparent 
successful candidate. The reason is clear—even though either could 
conceivably win the election, neither held an electoral college major-
ity following the popular election. 
Thus, although the Act may hold some ambiguities in ascertain-
ing the apparent winner, it is not so radically indeterminate so as to 
support any reading offered by the Administrator. The Administrator 
did not have discretion to name Ralph Nader the apparent winning 
candidate; nor did he have discretion to refuse to name George W. 
Bush the President-elect once Bush received a majority of certified 
electoral votes. At that point, Bush became the apparent winner, 
 
 35. See discussion infra notes 110–125 (describing Hawaii during 1960 election). 
 36. There have been seven faithless electors in the last century, in 1948, 1956, 1960, 
1968, 1972, 1976, and 1988.  In 1988, a Democratic Elector from West Virginia voted for 
Lloyd Bentsen for President and Michael Dukakis for Vice-President, rather than the other way 
around.  See Thomas H. Neale, The Electoral College: How It Works in Contemporary Presi-
dential Elections, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, at CRS-4 (July 21, 1999); see also NEAL R. 
PEIRCE & LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY, THE PEOPLE’S PRESIDENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 
IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND THE DIRECT VOTE ALTERNATIVE 98–101 (rev. ed. 1981). 
 37. See 107 CONG. REC. 13,349 (1963) (dialog between Mr. Haley and Mr. Fascell). 
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notwithstanding the fact that factors could intervene that might later 
prevent him from being the actual winner of the election. A candi-
date could fall ill on the night of the election, raising doubts about 
whether the candidate might survive until the electoral college met 
to formally elect him President. Nonetheless, it would be senseless to 
argue that this happenstance excused the Administrator from naming 
that candidate the President-elect under the statute. Whatever the 
ambiguity that may exist in the Act, the Act clearly compels the Ad-
ministrator to name an apparent winner when one candidate has se-
cured an electoral college majority. 
Despite the plain language of the statute, the Administrator re-
fused to release the transition resources until the results were clear, 
and maintained that the results would not be clear until all contests 
relating to the Florida election were resolved. As the foregoing dis-
cussion has indicated, this is a mistaken interpretation of the Act. 
This interpretation confuses the statutory requirement that there be 
an “apparent” winning candidate with a non-statutory concern that 
the apparent winner may not, in fact, turn out to be the “official” 
winner when the remaining issues are resolved. The Act requires only 
that the Administrator be sufficiently satisfied that one of the candi-
dates is the apparent winning candidate, not that he is certain to be 
the actual winning candidate. As noted, contingencies are always 
possible such that there is no way to guarantee that the apparent 
winner will turn out to be the actual winner. Once Governor George 
W. Bush received a sufficient number of electoral votes no question 
remained that he was, in fact, the apparent winning candidate for 
purposes of the statute, even though he may have eventually turned 
out to be the losing candidate, and not the actual winning candidate 
in the election. 
2. Identification of an “apparent” winner on the facts of the 2000 
election 
Because Bush held a certified electoral college majority, the Ad-
ministrator’s refusal to Act must have been based on his belief that 
the ascertainment of the “apparent” winner required a probabilistic 
evaluation of the likelihood that the apparent winner would turn out 
to be the actual winner in the end. Had the Administrator carefully 
conducted such an assessment, however, it would have been obvious 
that once Governor Jeb Bush of Florida filed the state’s Certificate of 
Ascertainment in George W. Bush’s favor, it would have been virtu-
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ally impossible for Gore to win the election. Although Gore could 
have won his court cases and perhaps even won a recount in Florida, 
there was effectively no possible way for him to seize Florida’s elec-
toral votes. He would have still faced numerous hurdles in order to 
have Florida’s twenty-five electoral votes counted in his favor. In-
deed, these hurdles were so numerous and daunting as to make it 
virtually impossible for Gore to have won. As one Democratic Con-
gressman observed on December 5, “[I]f you put money on [Al 
Gore’s] chances right now, you’d probably want points.”38 The be-
lief by some (including the Administrator) that Gore’s litigation 
could upset Bush’s victory as a legal matter seems to be based on a 
blatant misunderstanding of law governing presidential elections. 
Even if Gore won the litigation, he would have still almost certainly 
lost the election. 
On November 26, Governor Jeb Bush executed and filed Flor-
ida’s Certificate of Ascertainment on behalf of George W. Bush. 
Even if Gore had prevailed in a recount some time in December, this 
would not have displaced the original certificate; it only would have 
created the possibility of two different certificates. However, Jeb 
Bush could have simply refused to file the second certificate, or the 
Republican-controlled Florida state legislature could have ordered 
that the first certificate be recognized or awarded the state’s electoral 
votes to Bush. Moreover, depending on the date a second certificate 
would have been filed, the state legislature could have reasonably de-
cided not to file the second certificate if it fell outside of the “safe 
harbor” date for filing certificates. Thus, even if Gore had won the 
litigation and also won a subsequent ballot recount, there is substan-
tial question about whether Florida would have even filed a second 
certificate. 
Even if a second certificate had been filed on behalf of Gore, this 
would have simply raised the question of which of the two certifi-
cates should be counted in tabulating the electoral college votes. 
Based on congressional precedent, when confronted with two con-
flicting Certificates of Ascertainment, Congress must decide which 
one to recognize.39 Because the Republicans held a majority in the 
 
 38. Vincent Morris, Dem Front Shows Cracks; Congress Bigs Ask Patience As Some 
Lose Faith, N.Y. POST, Dec. 5, 2000, at 7, available at 2000 WL 30249067 (quoting Democ-
ratic Representative Jim Moran). 
 39. See infra notes 123–125 and accompanying text (discussing resolution of dispute 
over competing slates of electors from Hawaii during 1960 election). As discussed infra, in 
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House, the House presumably would have voted to count the Bush 
electors. In the Senate, the vote would presumably have been fifty-
to-fifty, with Gore as incumbent Vice-President breaking the tie as 
presiding officer in the Senate. But where the House and Senate 
choose to recognize different slates, the law provides that the state 
legislature of the state itself chooses which certificate to recognize.40 
Because Republicans controlled both houses of the Florida legisla-
ture, this rule would have obviously led to a recognition of the Bush 
electors. Thus, if Congress had been required to decide between two 
competing slates of electors, Bush would almost certainly have won 
the dispute. 
But Gore confronted yet another obstacle. Republicans would 
have had a sound basis for refusing to seat Democratic Senator-
designee Jean Carnahan of Missouri. Carnahan’s husband, Mel 
Carnahan, died in a plane crash just weeks before the Senate elec-
tion. Despite this, Missouri voters “elected” him to the United 
States Senate. This was interpreted as a vacancy by the Governor of 
Missouri, who filled the seat by naming Mel Carnahan’s widow, Jean 
Carnahan, to the seat. However, Republicans could have challenged 
Jean Carnahan from taking the seat on several grounds. First, there 
were irregularities in the St. Louis voting precincts on election night 
that cast doubt on the results of the election. Second, it is likely that 
Missouri’s election failed to comply with the Constitution, which 
provides that “No Person shall be a Senator . . . who shall not, when 
elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be cho-
sen.”41 The “winning” candidate, Mel Carnahan, was deceased at the 
time of the election, meaning that he could not have been an “in-
habitant” of the state of Missouri when he was elected. Thus, he 
could not have served as a Senator when elected, likely rendering the 
votes for him invalid, just as they would have been had, say, Donald 
Duck or some other fictional character received the greatest number 
of votes. A vote for an invalid candidate is tantamount to no vote at 
all, and typically such votes are considered “spoiled” or “undervote” 
ballots. Invalid ballots are simply not counted, thus making the can-
didate who received the greatest number of valid votes the winner. 
 
1960, the dispute was mooted by Nixon’s request that the Kennedy electors be recognized, an 
unlikely scenario for the 2000 election. 
 40. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994). 
 41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
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Thus, because Mel Carnahan was not a valid Senate candidate, Mis-
souri confronted no Senate vacancy for the Governor of the state to 
fill. 
Under the Constitution, each house of Congress is “the Judge of 
the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members.”42 
The combination of vote-fraud allegations and the constitutional 
violation in the manner in which Mel Carnahan was elected would 
have been sufficient to allow the Republicans to refuse to seat Jean 
Carnahan as a Senator.43 At the very least, it would have justified re-
fusing to seat her temporarily, until the matter could be resolved. 
This would have given the Republicans a fifty to forty-nine majority 
in the Senate when it came time to determine which of two compet-
ing slates of electors to recognize.44 
Taking these factors together, there was no plausible way for 
Gore to win the election once Florida’s electoral votes were certified 
for Bush on November 26. More fundamentally, the results of the 
Florida litigation were largely irrelevant to the eventual outcome of 
the election. At best, Gore could have precipitated a floor fight be-
tween two competing slates of electors, a fight that he almost cer-
tainly would have lost. Thus, there was no reasonable basis for the 
Administrator to believe that the outcome of the election depended 
on the outcome of the litigation. Evidently, he simply misunder-
stood the law of presidential elections.45 Thus, even had the Admin-
 
 42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
 43. If Jean Carnahan had sought to be elected to the Senate, she could have run as a 
write-in candidate. Write-in candidacies are the traditional mechanism for a candidate to com-
pete in an election if the candidate is unable to gain access to the election ballot for any reason. 
In fact, Strom Thurmond won election to the United States Senate in 1954 after a write-in 
campaign in South Carolina. See Bradley A. Smith, Note, Judicial Protection of Ballot-Access 
Rights: Third Parties Need Not Apply, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167, 194 n.142 (1991). 
 44. It is not clear whether the Democrats could have responded by walking out and pre-
venting a quorum or through some other mechanism that would have prevented the counting 
of the votes until Jean Carnahan was seated. 
 45. To be sure, Mr. Barram is not the only one who has committed the error of believ-
ing that the outcome of the Florida litigation would have affected the outcome of the election 
itself. Distinguished constitutional law scholars Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, for in-
stance, have written that the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore “handed” the election 
to Bush. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Legal Historicism and Legal Academics: The 
Roles of Law Professors in the Wake of Bush v. Gore, 90 GEO. L.J. 173, 174 (2001). As 
shown in the text, Bush effectively held the legal entitlement to the White House after Gover-
nor Jeb Bush certified the first slate of presidential electors in his favor. The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bush v. Gore, therefore, affected only the political calculus of whether Gore could 
induce Bush to concede, notwithstanding the fact that Bush would have been able to claim 
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istrator believed that he possessed the power to conduct an assess-
ment of the probable end-result of the election, there remained little 
doubt as a legal matter that Bush in fact would eventually prevail as 
the winner of the election. Bush could have lost in only the most 
unlikely of circumstances. First, Gore would have had to win the liti-
gation—which he actually lost in the United States Supreme Court. 
Second, he would have had to win the ballot recount—which inde-
pendent media recounts after the election concluded was highly un-
certain.46 Third, he would have had to convince the state of Florida 
to file a second Certificate of Ascertainment in light of a successful 
recount. Finally, he would have had to win the floor contest in Con-
gress over the recognition of the Gore slate rather than the Bush 
slate, which would have required either a Bush concession or a 
change of heart by the Republican-controlled Florida state legisla-
ture. All four of these were necessary conditions for Gore to prevail 
in the election; had any of them failed, then Gore could not win the 
election. Moreover, on few of these issues did Gore have a greater 
than infinitesimal chance of prevailing, much less prevailing on all 
four counts.47 In short, just as the Act prohibits the Administrator 
 
victory in the electoral college. In fact, this reality was confirmed by Ron Klain, the general 
counsel of the Gore recount team. In a public question and answer period at the Federalist 
Society’s National Lawyers Conference in November 2001, the author asked Klain what the 
“end-game” was to the Gore strategy. Mr. Klain acknowledged that the litigation would not 
have affected Congress’s power to recognize the Bush certificate and that the end-game strat-
egy for the Gore team was political, not legal. Gore hoped that if he won the recount he 
sought, Bush would concede the election notwithstanding his legal advantages. There is no 
evidence or reason to believe that Gore was correct in this supposition. Balkin and Levinson, of 
course, are not the only academics who could be identified as committing the error of believ-
ing that Gore would have won the election had he won a court-ordered recount in Florida, 
although they have been among the most outspoken expositors of that position. 
 46. According to independent media recounts, if Gore had won the litigation and re-
ceived a recount of the counties requested in his litigation, he would have still lost the election 
by approximately 225 to 493 votes. If a statewide recount of all ballots had been conducted, a 
request that was not part of Gore’s requested remedy, then Gore may have been able to win 
the state, depending on the ballot standards used. See Dan Keating & Dan Balz, Florida Re-
counts Would Have Favored Bush, But Study Finds Gore Might Have Won Statewide Tally of 
All Uncounted Ballots, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2001, at A1, available at 2001 WL 29762038. 
Thus, even had Gore won his litigation it is doubtful that he would have won the election. 
 47. At the risk of belaboring the point, it is worthwhile to conduct a thought experi-
ment regarding Gore’s chances in the days preceding the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. 
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). At that time, one might generously assign Gore a 50% likelihood of 
prevailing in the litigation and a 50% likelihood of winning a recount (subsequent events, of 
course, have shown that both of these figures probably overestimated his chances). Assuming 
he prevailed on both of these issues, one could again generously assign a probably of 75% to 
the possibility that a second certificate would be filed. Finally, Gore’s odds of winning a floor 
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from considering such long-shot possibilities as that of a faithless 
elector, he was equally unjustified in considering the long-shot pos-
sibility that Gore might actually win the election here. 
B. The Scope of the Administrator’s Discretion 
Even if the language of the statute is ambiguous in this context, 
the Administrator still lacked authority to interpret the Act as he did. 
The Act requires the Administrator to release the transition resources 
as soon as the apparent successful candidate can be identified. The 
Act vests some discretion in the Administrator to determine whether 
a candidate qualifies as the apparent successful candidate. But the 
scope of the Administrator’s discretion under the Act is narrowly cir-
cumscribed. Moreover, the scope of the Administrator’s limited dis-
cretion does not protect the Administrator’s decision to refuse the 
release of the transition resources to a candidate who holds a certi-
fied majority of electoral college votes. 
1. Under Chevron 
Even if the statute is ambiguous, it must still be determined that 
Congress intended to delegate law-making authority to the adminis-
trative agency. Although the Chevron doctrine is primarily a consti-
tutional doctrine relating to the separation of powers between the 
branches of the federal government,48 the Supreme Court has also 
noted that the doctrine is supported by the policy rationale that 
agencies usually have greater expertise as to the subject regulated 
than does Congress or the courts.49 Although it is not necessary for 
such an agency to have particular expertise in the subject matter 
 
fight in Congress could not possibility have exceeded 25%, for the reasons stated in the text. So 
Gore’s overall odds at that time were roughly (.5 x .5 x .75 x .25); or, about 4.7%. In retro-
spect, of course, this certainly overstates his chances, but even ex ante these odds are fairly in-
significant. 
 48. See In re Appletree Mkts., Inc., 19 F.3d 969, 973 (5th Cir. 1994) (“The Chevron 
doctrine is based upon separation of powers . . . .”). 
 49. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651–52 (1990) 
(“[P]ractical agency expertise is one of the principal justifications behind Chevron defer-
ence.”); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 845 (1986); see also 
United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 778 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that 
Court will tend to grant greater interpretive “leeway” when the issue falls within the agency’s 
policy-related expertise); Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 642 n.30 (1986) (noting 
that basis for deference is greater where the asserted regulatory power falls within agency’s par-
ticular expertise). 
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delegated to it, in determining whether Congress intended a delega-
tion it is relevant to inquire whether the agency has expertise in the 
subject matter.50 It is certainly possible that Congress might intend 
to delegate authority to an agency to issue regulatory decisions in an 
area where it has no particular expertise. Nonetheless, one would ex-
pect that if Congress intended such an unusual action, it would make 
its delegation exceedingly clear.51 In a situation where the agency 
that has purportedly received the delegation lacks any expertise with 
respect to the issue in question, one would expect Congress to be 
very explicit about why it was making such a delegation. 
The Act provides no evidence that Congress intended to dele-
gate broad decision-making authority to the Administrator; in fact, 
all logic and evidence points in the opposite direction. The Adminis-
trator of the GSA would be a curious choice to make the determina-
tion as to the who was the President-elect of the United States for 
purposes of the Act. The responsibilities of the GSA are to handle 
the purchasing of office supplies for the government and to print 
government publications.52 GSA Administrator David Barram was an 
executive at Apple Computer and Hewlett-Packard before President 
Clinton appointed him to run the GSA.53 There is little in Barram’s 
background prior to entering government or his experience as Ad-
ministrator of the GSA to suggest that he would be appropriately 
qualified to make the important legal and factual determinations re-
quired by the Act. Indeed, his terrible misunderstanding of the law 
governing presidential elections illustrates his lack of expertise and 
unsuitability for the delegation supposedly made by the Act. Given 
the GSA’s function and the Administrator’s expertise, it is far more 
plausible to believe that Congress might defer to the Administrator 
the discretion to choose between the ordering of No. 1 lead versus 
No. 2 lead pencils than it is to believe that Congress intended for the 
 
 50. See United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 394 (1999); Aluminum 
Co. of Am. v. Cent. Lincoln Peoples’ Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 390 (1984). 
 51. Accord FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159–60 
(2000). (“[W]e are confident that Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of 
such economic and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”). 
 52. See Charles W. Holmes, Transition: Agency That Facilitates Transfer of Power is 
Caught in Middle, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 29, 2000, at 8A, available at 2000 WL 
5488950 (“The GSA is an agency that normally spends its time managing the nuts and bolts of 
governing: leasing office space, printing publications, ordering light bulbs and managing com-
puter systems. It seldom gets the kind of attention now being turned on it.”). 
 53. Id. 
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Administrator to determine the “President-elect” of the United 
States.54 
The Administrator’s obvious lack of expertise suggests that Con-
gress did not intend to make a general delegation of law-making 
power to the GSA administrator. Under the terms and structure of 
the Act, the Administrator serves as a largely ministerial officer for 
purposes of executing the terms of the Act. The discretion afforded 
to the Administrator is to make the factual determination of whether 
a candidate is the apparent winner of the election.55 This narrow fac-
tual finding provides no basis for the Administrator to freelance with 
respect to rewriting the legal standard or for an arbitrary assessment 
of the factors that he subjectively believes to be important. The Act 
implies a bright-line legal standard that should be applied according 
to objectively determinable facts that the Administrator may consider 
in reaching his conclusion. Moreover, it provides a test that can be 
implemented by reference to objective facts and provides a basis for 
ensuring that the Administrator’s conclusion be reasonably justified 
by reference to those facts. It provides no basis for the Administra-
tor’s belief that it allows him to indulge his subjective assessments as 
to the legal standard to apply or the facts to consider. Once the Ad-
ministrator makes the factual determination of one of the candidates 
as the apparent winner, he is instructed to release the transition funds 
to that candidate upon request. The Administrator has narrow dis-
cretion to make the factual determination of “who is the apparent 
winner in order to perform the ministerial functions under this 
act.”56 His discretion under the statute is limited to this narrow fac-
tual finding; there is no evidence that Congress intended a more 
general delegation to the Administrator. Thus, if Chevron governs 
the interpretation of the Act, then there is still no reason to believe 
that the Administrator was acting within the scope of delegated 
power. 
 
 54. In a different context, Brown & Williamson expressly instructs courts to apply their 
“common sense” to the question to determine whether Congress may have intended a particu-
lar delegation where it will have especially significant economic and political magnitude. See 
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133. 
 55. See 109 CONG. REC. 13,348 (1963) (statement of Mr. Fascell). 
 56. Id. 
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2. Under Skidmore 
Given the lack of expertise of the GSA in making the determina-
tion in question here and the slapdash procedures used to make the 
decision, it is thus doubtful that Congress intended to make a Chev-
ron-style delegation of authority to the Administrator in this case to 
render an authoritative legal interpretation of the Act. Instead, the 
Administrator’s actions should be reviewed under the less-deferential 
Skidmore standard of review,57 which was recently reiterated by the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Mead Corp.58 There the Court 
held that Chevron deference is owed only “when it appears that 
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules 
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming 
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”59 Oth-
erwise, Skidmore controls. 
In discerning congressional intent to delegate law-making au-
thority under Chevron, a court will examine, among other factors, 
the rule-making processes used by the agency to articulate its regula-
tion. The case for deference is stronger where the final decision is 
rendered by some sort of formal and deliberative process reached af-
ter compliance with the notice-and-comment rules of the APA.60 Be-
cause Chevron essentially grants the executive power to engage in 
interstitial rulemaking within the ambiguities of the statute,61 such 
regulations are usually promulgated according to the formalities gen-
erally associated with lawmaking activity, such as notice and com-
ment and due process. As the Court stated in Mead, “[i]t is fair to 
assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative action 
with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal 
administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and 
deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force.”62 
Where such formalities are absent, by contrast, Skidmore applies.  
The Supreme Court has been more troubled when the policy is 
articulated through opinions derived through processes other than 
 
 57. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 58. 533 U.S. 218, 121 S. Ct. 2164 (2001). 
 59. Id. at 2171. 
 60. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586 (2000). 
 61. See In re Appletree Mkts., Inc., 19 F.3d 969, 973 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Executive 
rulemaking is actually interstitial legislation . . . .”). 
 62. Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2172. 
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notice-and-comment and formal rule-making, although it has upheld 
decisions made through this process.63 Here, even such a watered-
down form of due process was absent. Congress, it is suggested, 
would not be likely to delegate law-making authority to an agency 
that could then exercise that powerful authority without the safe-
guards of notice-and-hearing and other protections. Where the Ad-
ministrator makes a summary interpretation of the statute without 
any sort of formal rule-making or regulatory procedures, as he did 
here, little deference is owed.64 The Skidmore doctrine applies in 
such situations rather than the Chevron doctrine, meaning that the 
agency pronouncement is treated as having only persuasive authority 
rather than binding authority.65 Just as it is inappropriate to second-
guess a legitimate delegation of law-making power from Congress to 
an agency, it is equally inappropriate to create such a delegation 
where Congress intended no such delegation.66 
Here, the Administrator’s interpretation of the Act is largely un-
persuasive and would not be likely to be acceptable were it reviewed 
in court. Under Skidmore, therefore, deference to the Administrator 
 
 63. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. (“Interpretations such as those in opinion letters—
like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guide-
lines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.”); see also 
NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256–57, 263 (1995). 
 64. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256–58 (1991) (stating that in-
terpretive guidelines do not receive Chevron deference); Martin v. Occupational Safety & 
Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991) (stating that interpretive rules and en-
forcement guidelines are “not entitled to the same deference as norms that derive from the 
exercise of the Secretary’s delegated lawmaking powers”). 
 65. See Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2175; Christensen, 529 U.S. at 586–87. 
 66. See Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and 
the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 42 (1990) (“Which interpretations, then, should be recog-
nized as carrying the force of law, and as therefore binding on the courts and the public? The 
answer is simple: only those that Congress intended to have the force of law. . . . [T]he key 
question in each case is whether Congress delegated the authority to issue interpretations with 
the force of law in this format.”); id. at 44 (“For the critical situation in which Congress has 
not indicated its delegatory intent, the court cannot simply assume that a ‘gap’ in the substan-
tive meaning of a statute automatically establishes a delegation whereunder any reasonable 
agency interpretation will bind the courts. This approach wrongly throws the armor of limited 
review around all interpretations, regardless of the formats in which they are expressed.”); see 
also Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 872 
(2001) (“[I]f Chevron rests on a presumption about congressional intent, then Chevron 
should apply only where Congress would want Chevron to apply. In delineating the types of 
delegations of agency authority that trigger Chevron deference, it is therefore important to 
determine whether a plausible case can be made that Congress would want such a delegation 
to mean that agencies enjoy primary interpretational authority.”). 
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is inappropriate. As Justice Jackson observed in Skidmore, “[t]he 
weight [given to an administrative] judgment in a particular case will 
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the va-
lidity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pro-
nouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, 
if lacking power to control.”67 The nondeliberative, indeed bizarre, 
nature of the Administrator’s decision-making process in this case, its 
lack of grounding in the statute’s language and history, and the 
shoddiness of the Administrator’s decision-making process all sug-
gest that a court would give little weight to the Administrator’s in-
terpretation.68 And because of its persuasive rather than constitu-
tional grounding, the presence of agency expertise is even more 
important for Skidmore deference than for Chevron—an expertise 
that is manifestly absent in this case.69 Indeed, Skidmore contem-
plates at least a modicum of deliberation, expertise, and due process, 
none of which was present in the Administrator’s decision. It is diffi-
cult to believe that Congress intended to constitutionally delegate to 
the Administrator the authority to interpret a statute of high national 
importance without any articulated standard as well as the power to 
willy-nilly revise any standard that he did announce, yet provide no 
opportunity for the affected parties to contest the Administrator’s 
decision. Nor is this a detailed regulatory scheme where the Admin-
istrator has any sort of expertise.70 In such cases, not only is Chevron 
deference not owed, but even Skidmore deference should be re-
jected.71 
C. The Administrator’s Construction of the Statute 
Was Unreasonable 
Even if the statute is ambiguous and it is believed that the Ad-
 
 67. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 68. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 586. 
 69. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139 (noting that the source of Skidmore deference is 
based on an agency’s “specialized experience and [the] broader investigations and informa-
tion” available to the agency). 
 70. Cf. Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2175 (“There is room at least to raise a Skidmore claim 
here, where the regulatory scheme is highly detailed, and Customs can bring the benefit of 
specialized experience to bear on the subtle questions in this case . . . .”). 
 71. See Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the 
Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1136 (2001) (“Skidmore advises a 
sliding scale of deference, or ‘respect,’ based on its factors of agency expertise, consistency, 
contemporaneous, and thoroughness of consideration.”). 
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ministrator was delegated the authority to interpret the Act, any such 
interpretation must still be reasonable to be binding. The recogni-
tion of the narrow scope of the Administrator’s discretion to make a 
narrow factual finding of whether a candidate can be ascertained as 
having an electoral college majority is the only one consistent with 
the language, structure, and policies of the Act. The Act clearly con-
templates that there will be minimal discretion vested in the Admin-
istrator to make the determination as to when one candidate has be-
come the apparent winning candidate. Once that determination is 
made, the Act relegates the Administrator to a wholly ministerial 
role. Given the predominantly ministerial role envisioned for the 
Administrator under the statute, it is absurd to think that Congress 
vested broad discretion in the Administrator to make an uncon-
strained determination of when an apparent winning candidate has 
been identified. Rather, Congress clearly contemplated that the de-
termination would be narrow and constrained by objective facts, 
most obviously whether any candidate has earned a sufficient num-
ber of electoral votes to become President. 
The Act’s emphasis on speed and continuity further indicates 
that the transition was expected to begin as soon as an apparent win-
ner was identified, even though further contingencies or develop-
ments might later render this judgment erroneous as to the actual 
winner.72 Allowing the Administrator to determine according to his 
own time-table when he is subjectively satisfied that a candidate has 
qualified as the President-elect threatens substantial delay of transi-
tion activities and essentially gives the Administrator the primary role 
in determining the success or failure of the new administration’s 
transition and first year in office. It is simply not a logical or reason-
able statutory scheme to believe that Congress intended to vest such 
powerful discretion and authority in a minor ministerial agent. Pro-
fessor Jonathan Turley testified to Congress that empowering the 
Administrator of the GSA to make the determination as to the ap-
parent winner is a “bizarre choice.” 73 Although accurate, this cri-
 
 72. The policies of the Act are discussed in greater detail infra at Part V. 
 73. Transitioning to a New Administration: Can the Next President Be Ready?: Hearing 
Before the House Comm. on Gov’t Reform, Subcomm. on Gov’t Mgmt., Info., and Tech. 
(Dec. 4, 2000) (statement of Jonathon Turley) available at http://www.house.gov/ 
reform/gmit/hearings/2000hearings/001204.Transition/001204jt.htm [hereinafter Turley 
Testimony] (calling the Administrator of the GSA a “bizarre choice to make any designation of 
an apparent winner in a presidential election”). 
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tique misses the point. Providing this power to the GSA Administra-
tor would be a bizarre choice if determining the actual winner re-
quired any substantial degree of judgment or expertise. But as the 
Act is written and as the authors of the Act understood, identifying 
the apparent winner requires little discretion or expertise. There is 
nothing in the statute to suggest that the Administrator has been 
delegated the unreviewable discretion to hold up the disbursement 
of the transition funds based on his subjective evaluation about the 
eventual outcome of the election when there is no substantial evi-
dence to support this delay. 
It is not a reasonable construction of the Act to interpret it in 
such a manner as to vest such broad, unreviewable discretion in the 
Administrator. It is generally assumed that Congress does not intend 
to draft illogical or irrational legislation.74 Reading the Act so as to 
vest broad, unreviewable discretion in the Administrator would con-
stitute exactly such an utter irrationality. It is implausible to believe 
that Congress meant for a ministerial officer such as the General Ser-
vices Administrator to wield such potentially vast power. After all, 
the Administrator’s duties are to handle the purchasing of office sup-
plies and printing governmental publications. This is undoubtedly a 
vast and important responsibility, but there is little reason to believe 
that it qualifies the GSA Administrator to make a discretionary legal 
judgment as to the meaning of the term “President-elect” under the 
Act or to make an unfettered subjective assessment of the facts of the 
situation. One might expect with equal plausibility that Congress 
would vest the Secretary of HUD with the power to order military 
air strikes on Iraq. In both cases, the particular expertise of the gov-
ernment official claiming the power in question is simply inconsistent 
with the responsibility claimed under the statute. One could imagine 
Congress making such a peculiar delegation of power, but if so, one 
would expect that Congress would act unambiguously and explain 
why it chose such a strange course. Here, by contrast, Congress 
 
 74. See Pub. Citizen v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (1989) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) (“When used in a proper manner, this narrow exception to our normal 
rule of statutory construction does not intrude upon the lawmaking powers of Congress, but 
rather demonstrates a respect for the coequal Legislative Branch, which we assume would not 
act in an absurd way.”); United States v. DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(“We will only look beyond the plain language of a statute at extrinsic materials to determine 
the congressional intent if: (1) the statute’s language is ambiguous; (2) applying it according to 
its plain meaning would lead to an absurd result; or (3) there is clear evidence of contrary legis-
lative intent.”). 
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spoke ambiguously at best and in fact seems to have spoken strongly 
in the opposite direction. That such a construction of the statute is 
necessary to reach such an absurd results indicates that the construc-
tion is incorrect. It is the proffered construction of the statute, not 
the statute itself, that generates this irrational result. The statute cer-
tainly does not command this absurd result. 
A far more sensible construction of the statute is that Congress 
intended for the Administrator to act as a ministerial officer under 
the statute with limited discretionary power. Indeed, if Congress had 
intended for the Administrator to wield so much discretion, it almost 
certainly would have taken steps to ensure that the discretion was not 
exercised in an arbitrary or irrational way. For instance, Congress 
could have provided some mechanism for review of the Administra-
tor’s discretion, such as by appeal to a court, or it could have vested 
the discretion in a more senior governmental official with more rele-
vant expertise, such as the Attorney General. Congress also could 
have vested the exercise of such discretion in an independent com-
mission or some other body empowered to make the decision free of 
partisan political influences. Alternatively, Congress might have es-
tablished specific factors for the Administrator to consider so as to 
channel his discretion, such as whether one candidate has conceded 
or whether recounts are still ongoing. Congress also presumably 
would have required the Administrator to create some written record 
of the factors he actually considered in exercising his discretion and 
an explanation for how he reached his conclusion. 
In fact, Congress provided for none of these options. There are 
no procedural constraints on the exercise of the Administrator’s dis-
cretion, such as appeals. There are no substantive constraints in the 
Act, such as an identification of the factors the Administrator should 
consider in reaching his decision. In the 2000 election, the Adminis-
trator vacillated among a number of different theories and explana-
tions for his action, or more precisely, his inaction. Testifying before 
Congress almost a full month after election night he still expressly 
refused to articulate how and when he would reach his conclusion or 
what factors he would consider, stating “I don’t want to predict how 
I will select an apparent winner.”75 It is inconceivable that Congress 
intended this ministerial officer to exercise unreviewable, uncon-
strained discretion of the sort he claimed during the 2000 election. 
 
 75. Archibald, Congress Attempts to Speed Transition, supra note 10, at A8. 
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If Congress had intended this, it almost certainly would have placed 
some substantive and/or procedural limits on the Administrator’s 
discretion. That Congress did not provide for some reasonable con-
straint on the Administrator’s discretion—or any constraint for that 
matter—indicates that it did not intend to grant plenary, unreview-
able discretion as claimed by the Administrator. 
Given the absence of such constraints, it is far more plausible that 
Congress did not intend for him to possess such broad discretion. 
Congress plainly intended for the Administrator’s discretion to be 
very narrow and limited to the predicate factual determination of the 
apparent successful candidate. Although in some cases it might be 
difficult to ascertain the apparent winner, where one candidate has a 
certified majority it is not. Instead, the Administrator claimed that 
the absence of guidance from Congress empowered him to exercise 
his unfettered, subjective judgment as to when he was sufficiently 
persuaded that an apparent winner could be identified.76 This is an 
astounding claim. It is far more plausible that Congress did not pro-
vide guidance for his decision or review of his decision because it be-
lieved that the decision would be a mechanical decision controlled by 
objective facts, such as whether a candidate could claim a certified 
electoral majority. Congress’s failure to expressly limit his discretion 
makes sense only in the context of its manifest intent to provide the 
Administrator with minimal discretion and that this decision should 
be reached through objective, easily-verifiable criteria. 
The claim that the Act grants the Administrator plenary authority 
to make a subjective determination as to when he believes the appar-
ent winner is ascertainable raises further concerns. In the context of 
the 2000 election, there is strong evidence that the Administrator’s 
decision was heavily influenced by political pressures emanating from 
 
 76. See Sergio Bustos, Bush Seeks Transition Donations, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 28, 
2000, at A1, available at 2000 WL 8087405 (statement of GSA spokeswoman Vicki Reath); 
William M. Welch, Democrats Anticipate End to Contest: Party Standing by Gore, but Some 
See Appeal as Last Chance, USA TODAY, Dec. 5, 2000, at 8A, available at 2000 WL 5797265 
(statement by David Barram that Act does not allow him to designate a President-elect “when 
‘it is not apparent to me who the winner is’” (emphasis added)); George Archibald, Donors 
Fill Gap As Fight Drags on: Bush Team Raises Over $6.4 Million, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 4, 
2000, at A10, available at 2000 WL 4171186 (statement of White House spokesman Jake 
Siewart that GSA Administrator should not declare a President-elect “if there’s any doubt in 
the mind of the administrator” (emphasis added)); Barram Testimony, supra note 13 (asserting 
that the Act “gives no explicit criteria or deadlines for making [the] ascertainment” of a Presi-
dent-elect, thus leaving the decision up to the GSA Administrator). 
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the Clinton White House that instructed the Administrator—a po-
litical appointee—to refrain from declaring Bush the apparent win-
ner.77 The White House denied exerting such pressure. On Novem-
ber 9, the day after the election, the Administrator held a televised 
press conference to announce that the transition offices were ready 
for occupancy, and that he was ready to release the $5.3 million in 
presidential transition funds and the keys to the transition offices “to 
whichever candidate garnered the necessary 270 electoral votes after 
Florida’s outcome was certified.”78 “But,” GSA officials later admit-
ted, “as the Florida muddle unfolded, the Clinton-Gore administra-
tion stepped in to halt the start of any transition.”79 Once Gore be-
gan legal challenges in Florida, “the White House stepped in to 
oversee and supervise Mr. Barram, a Clinton appointee.”80 Within 
days of the election, it was announced that “Barram alone will not 
make the decision,” but would do so only after consulting with the 
White House.81 On November 13, White House Chief of Staff John 
Podesta promulgated a memorandum ordering that transition plan-
ning be put “on hold” and that no transition assistance should be 
given to either candidate until the Florida controversy was defini-
tively resolved.82 Podesta’s directive was issued the day before Florida 
Secretary of State Katherine Harris was to certify Florida’s recounted 
returns.83 It appears that the instructions to await the resolution of 
the Gore legal challenges in Florida emanated from the White 
House.84 The Administrator’s final position that he lacked the au-
 
 77. See James Toedtman, No Keys to Kingdom: Clinton Won’t Give Bush Office, 
$5.3M for Transition, NEWSDAY, Nov. 28, 2000, at A05 (noting that GSA Administrator was 
“taking his cue from White House Chief of Staff John Podesta”). 
 78. Archibald, White House Puts Transition on Hold, supra note 8, at A3; see also 
Archibald, Bush Won’t Get Keys, supra note 8, at A1 (announcing that the offices were ready 
and that he was ready to turn over the keys to the president-elect). 
 79. Archibald, Bush Won’t Get Keys, supra note 8. 
 80. Archibald, White House Puts Transition on Hold, supra note 8. 
 81. See Bob Davis, New President-Elect’s Transition Team May Find GSA Director 
Holds the Keys, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2000, at A12, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 26617405 
(“Mr. Barram, of course, was appointed to his post by the White House, and he won’t be de-
ciding about the transition keys by himself. White House Cabinet Secretary Thurgood Mar-
shall Jr., son of the late Supreme Court justice and a former Gore aide, has already instructed 
the GSA and cabinet heads to notify White House Chief of Staff John Podesta before making a 
decision on the transition.”). 
 82. See Archibald, White House Puts Transition on Hold, supra note 8. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
3ZYW.DOC 3/5/02  8:34 PM 
1573] The Law of Presidential Transitions 
 1601 
thority to release the funds in a “close” election also tracks the even-
tual position taken by the White House on the issue.85 The White 
House denied that this congruence of opinion was the result of po-
litical pressure.86 Given the nature and timing of the Administrator’s 
vacillations, it is difficult to believe that the White House applied no 
political pressure on the Administrator. 
Even if it is believed, somewhat incredibly, that the Administra-
tor was not influenced by political pressures from the White House 
during the 2000 election, his belief that the Act allowed him to exer-
cise unfettered discretion and his refusal to articulate any legal stan-
dard or to specifically identify which facts will be relevant in making 
the determination raises the clear possibility that in future elections 
the Administrator will be improperly influenced by political consid-
erations. In a situation such as the 2000 election where the opposi-
tion party controls the White House, this raises the concern that the 
release of the transition resources will be held up so as to undermine 
the success of the new party’s transition to power. The Act provides 
no mechanism to force the Administrator to act or to review his de-
cision not to act. 
Given the alternative possible constructions of the statute, the 
only one that makes sense is that Congress did not intend to vest 
broad discretion in the Administrator. Rather, Congress intended 
that he would be governed by bright-line rules, such as whether one 
of the candidates had a majority of pledged and certified electors. 
Moreover, as noted, this construction fits more closely with the plain 
language of the statute and its clear legislative intent. It is illogical to 
believe that Congress vested this anonymous ministerial officer with 
the unconstrained, unreviewable discretion to determine the “Presi-
dent-elect” for purposes of the Act’s terms. Indeed, the Administra-
 
 85. Jake Siewert, Press Briefing, M2 PRESSWIRE, Nov. 29, 2000, available at 2000 WL 
29589210 (“I think the legislative history makes pretty clear that if there’s any doubt in the 
mind of the GSA Administrator, that they [sic] should not move forward and no money 
should be expended.”). This legal position is highly suspect. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 86. The White House claimed that the similarity of opinion was to be expected because 
the compelling persuasiveness of the legislative history made it difficult to reach any other con-
clusion. See Susan Carroll & Tom Collins, White House Meddling in Transition, Kolbe Says, 
TUCSON CITIZEN, Nov. 29, 2000, at 13A, available at 2000 WL 27444840 (quoting White 
House spokesman, “This has been portrayed in the media in large sense as some sort of deci-
sion that we’ve made here [at the White House]. In reality, there’s a law governing this. I 
think anyone who is familiar with transitions . . . can take a look at that law and see what it says 
for themselves.”). 
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tor’s actions during the 2000 election demonstrate the unsuitability 
of allowing this minor official to exercise the crucial powers claimed 
under the Act. The Administrator refused to articulate a definitive 
legal interpretation of the Act or to state what factual criteria he 
would use in reaching his decision. When he did actually provide 
some evidence of his subjective decision-making, he vacillated among 
several different standards, none of which seemed to have any 
grounding in the text, intent, or policies of the statute. He seized on 
legally-irrelevant factors, such as the lack of a concession, to justify 
his refusal to declare an apparent winner, while simultaneously ignor-
ing the primary, if not exclusive, factor that the Act instructed him to 
consider: whether a certified electoral college majority could be iden-
tified. When he finally made up his mind, it was based on an ex post 
facto and ad hoc judgment that he was finally persuaded that he 
could ascertain an apparent winner according to his unstated legal 
and factual standards. When not relying upon the rationale of a lack 
of a concession, he pointed to the one factor that Congress was most 
obvious in excluding, namely the continuation of legal proceedings 
and ballot recounts that might eventually overturn the designation of 
an apparent winner. 
If Congress had intended to vest this discretion in the Adminis-
trator, it almost certainly would have required that the Administrator 
articulate the legal and factual standards he would apply and would 
have provided some mechanisms for guiding and reviewing his dis-
cretion. Instead, the Administrator claimed the power to make up 
the legal and factual standard as his subjective assessment of the 
situation changed. The absurdity of the Administrator’s construction 
of the statute and the bizarre belief that his erratic actions were con-
sistent with the statute’s mandates indicate the unreasonableness of 
his interpretation. Given the choice between an absurd construction 
of the statute and one that fits with the language, intent, and policies 
of the statute, it is presumed that Congress meant to enact the stat-
ute in a way that actually makes sense. 
III. HISTORICAL AND LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT OF THE ACT 
The Administrator also argued that the legislative history of the 
Act supported his interpretation that he was not required to release 
the transition funds to Bush despite his having gained a majority of 
certified electoral votes. Indeed, in the waning days of the election 
controversy he argued that he was forbidden from releasing the tran-
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sition resources to Bush while the election remained a “close” elec-
tion. He based his claim on some snippets of legislative history 
drawn from the floor debates on the Act. In reviewing this legislative 
history, however, the Administrator pulled the statements in ques-
tion out of their proper legislative and historical context. When read 
in context, it is evident that the Administrator is mistaken about the 
significance of the legislative history on which he relied.  
Because of the Administrator’s heavy reliance on legislative his-
tory, this Part will explore the general historical and legislative con-
text of the Act, showing that when read in its totality the legislative 
history supports the interpretation of the Act that has been advanced 
in this essay. A review of the legislative history will also reveal that 
the factors on which the Administrator actually relied, namely the 
need for a concession by one of the candidates or an end to all litiga-
tion in the case, are plainly excluded by the legislative and historical 
context of the Act. Part IV of this essay then examines in greater de-
tail the specific excerpts from the legislative history relied upon by 
the Administrator. It will be shown that the slivers of legislative his-
tory relied on by the Administrator were taken out of context. Once 
they are understood in their historical and legislative contexts, it will 
be seen that they fail to support the interpretation advanced by the 
Administrator. 
A. Legislative History 
The crucial distinction between the apparent and actual success-
ful candidate is evident in the legislative discussion surrounding the 
enactment of the Act. The legislative history of the Act is quite 
summary, and little of it deals with the issues raised by the 2000 elec-
tion.87 Nonetheless, there is some legislative history available in the 
form of floor statements during debates over the Act. Floor ex-
changes are a disfavored form of legislative history, but they are valu-
able in amplifying the plain language of the statute, especially where, 
as here, there is no helpful committee report.88 One floor exchange 
during the debate is especially illuminating, and so it is reproduced 
 
 87. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-301 (1963); S. REP. NO. 88-448 (1963); H.R. CONF. REP. 
NO. 88-1148 (1964). Most of the committee report concerns issues of campaign financing, 
rather than transition issues. 
 88. See Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 64 n.5 (1990) (noting that absent a committee re-
port courts will generally treat statements of floor manager as tantamount to committee re-
port). 
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here at length: 
Mr. HALEY. I wish the gentleman in charge of handling the bill at 
this time would give to the members of the committee a little ex-
planation of when under the terms of this bill a person becomes the 
President or Vice-President-elect. 
I notice that these funds can be used immediately after the general 
election in November. But how would this situation work, for in-
stance, if the President or, at least, before the determination of the 
votes in the electoral college, suppose that some person was, say, 
three or four votes shy? How would this Administrator determine 
who was in a position to expend these funds? 
The reason I ask this is because in my humble opinion a person 
does not become the President or President-elect until after the 
Congress has had an opportunity to examine the ballots cast in the 
electoral college. Only at that point when that determination has 
been made by the House of Representatives does a man become 
the President-elect. 
Mr. FASCELL. I would say to my distinguished colleague . . . that 
the gentleman is absolutely right in a technical sense with respect to 
the determination of the election of the President and the Vice 
President. . . . 
[The relevant statutory language was then quoted] 
 This act and the Administrator could in no way, in any way, af-
fect the election of the successful candidate. The only decision the 
Administrator can make is who the successful candidate—apparent 
successful candidate—for the purposes of this particular act in order 
to make the services provided by this act available to them. And, if 
there is any doubt in his mind and if he cannot or does not desig-
nate the apparently successful candidate, then the act is inoperative. 
He cannot do anything. There will be no services provided and no 
money expended.89 
This colloquy amplifies the plain language of the Act—that the 
relevant determination to be made by the Administrator is solely to 
determine whether one candidate is the “apparent” successful candi-
date, not whether that candidate is guaranteed to be the actual suc-
 
 89. 109 CONG. REC. 13,349 (1963) (emphasis added). 
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cessful candidate after the Congress counts the ballots in the elec-
toral college. It is also evident that the inquiry is intended to be 
made in light of whether a candidate has a majority of certified and 
pledged electoral votes. If a candidate lacked sufficient electoral 
votes—such as being “three or four votes shy” of an electoral college 
majority—then no apparent winner could be recognized until the 
election was actually resolved in the electoral college or House of 
Representatives. 
But this hypothetical situation was not the case in the 2000 elec-
tion. In that election, after Florida certified its electoral results Bush 
in fact had a sufficient number of pledged and certified electoral 
votes to be elected President. Thus, even though one could imagine 
situations where it might be difficult or impossible for the Adminis-
trator to identify the apparent successful candidate, this case is not 
one of them. Absent an adequate number of electoral votes there is 
no apparent successful candidate; but where one candidate has a suf-
ficient number of electoral votes to be elected President, then that 
individual is the apparent winning candidate. Neither case is difficult. 
B. Historical Context: The 1960 Election 
Congress believed that the inquiry to determine the apparent 
winner of the election generally would be routine and would be 
amenable to resolution by objective facts of the type presented in the 
2000 election. Congressman Haley and Congressman Fascell recog-
nized that some cases may arise where the Administrator will be un-
able to designate an apparently successful candidate, although Con-
gressman Fascell deemed this “an unlikely proposition.”90 Indeed, 
the historical setting and political context of the 1963 Act provides 
important context for understanding the bright-line nature of the 
Congressional inquiry. Congressman Fascell observed: 
I do not see any great big problem in the Administrator of the 
General Services Administration being unduly involved in the mat-
ter of determining who is the apparent winner in order to perform 
the ministerial functions under this act. . . . The gentleman previ-
ously pointed out in the last election [the 1960 presidential elec-




 90. Id. 
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election and nobody had any trouble in deciding who was the ap-
parent winner.91 
Understanding how the Act would have applied to the facts of 
the 1960 election helps to illuminate the distinction drawn between 
the actual and apparent winners of the election. In turn, understand-
ing this history indicates how the authors of the Act intended the 
Act to apply in a situation like the 2000 election. The 1960 election 
was an extremely close and highly contested election, almost identi-
cal to the 2000 election. In fact, the final winner of the 1960 elec-
tion could not be predicted confidently for several weeks after the 
election date. Nonetheless, Fascell observes that despite the closeness 
of the election and the questions raised about who might prevail as 
the actual winner, it was not difficult to determine that Kennedy was 
the apparent winner. Given that the Act was enacted against the 
backdrop of the Nixon-Kennedy election, it is important to under-
stand the facts of that election. Understanding how the Act would 
have applied to those facts helps to illuminate the distinction the Act 
draws between the “apparent” winner and the actual winner. In 
turn, that history will help to explain how the Act should have been 
applied to the 2000 presidential election. 
1. General history of the 1960 election 
Legend has long held that there were credible allegations that 
John F. Kennedy “stole” the 1960 presidential election through 
massive voter fraud in several states and that despite the belief that 
Kennedy had stolen the election, Nixon refused to challenge Ken-
nedy’s victory and stepped aside “for the good of the country.” This 
legend is false. Indeed, it was not for some time after the election 
that one could confidently say that Kennedy would actually win the 
electoral college. The final outcomes in several states remained in 
doubt for quite some time pending the final resolution of recounts 
and Republican-initiated litigation.92 Litigation and recounts pro-
ceeded apace in several states and the final results of the election 
 
 91. Id. at 13,348 (emphasis added). 
 92. This is not to say that Nixon necessarily organized or inspired the litigation and re-
count efforts. He claimed that he had no role in it, but historians have concluded otherwise. 
See Gerald Posner, The Fallacy of Nixon’s Graceful Exit, SALON.COM (Nov. 10, 2000), at 
http://www.salon.com/politics/feature/2000/11/10/nixon/print.html. 
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were not established for several weeks after the election. Nonethe-
less, this did not detract from the fact that Kennedy could have been 
determined to be the apparent winner. 
California, then as now a large and important state, was origi-
nally credited to Kennedy, but its thirty-two electoral votes were 
later awarded to Nixon after absentee ballots were counted.93 Credi-
ble allegations of vote fraud in Illinois and Texas generated Republi-
can litigation and recount efforts in those two states. Kennedy car-
ried Illinois by fewer than 9,000 votes; Republicans alleged that the 
margin of victory was manufactured by Mayor Richard Daley’s Cook 
County Machine.94 Similarly, Kennedy carried Texas by just over 
40,000 votes, largely as a result of the help of Vice-Presidential can-
didate Lyndon Johnson, who was a Texas Senator.95 David Green-
berg observes that “many states besides Texas and Illinois could have 
gone either way.”96 A Republican spokesman announced that the 
party had received many complaints alleging fraud, bribes, and other 
irregularities in several states, mostly from Illinois, Texas, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Michigan, and New Jersey.97 
Republican Party National Chairman Thruston Morton asked for 
recounts in eleven states within three days after the election.98 Nixon 
aides also did personal field checks of votes in eight of those states, 
looking for evidence of fraud and election irregularity that could be 
used to reverse the results in those states.99 Another aide encouraged 
the creation of a Nixon Recount Committee in Chicago.100 Reporter 
Earl Mazo of the New York Herald Tribune reported on a series of 
fraud-related issues that were picked-up by other reporters and 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. See David Greenberg, Was Nixon Robbed? The Legend of the Stolen 1960 Presi-
dential Election, SLATE (Oct. 16, 2000), available at http://slate.msn.com/HistoryLesson/ 
00-10-16/HistoryLesson.asp. In fact, rumors about fraud in Illinois circulated even before 
election day. 
 95. Posner, supra note 92. Republicans charged that Democratic-controlled election 
boards consistently invalidated Republican ballots with slight defects while counting Democ-
ratic ballots with identical defects. See PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 36, at 68–69. 
 96. Greenberg, supra note 94. 
 97. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 36, at 68. 
 98. The effort was spearheaded by Republican Party Chairman Senator Thruston Mor-
ton, telegramming officials in Delaware, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, Nevada, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Texas, and urging recount efforts. 
See Greenberg, supra note 94. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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served to fuel the recount and litigation fires. 
Recounts actually proceeded in several states. In New Jersey, the 
Republican Party secured court orders for recounts in five counties 
and did not cease the recount effort until December 1.101 Kennedy 
was certified the state’s winner by 22,091 votes. In Texas, the Re-
publican Party sued to overturn the results, securing a federal court 
injunction to delay certification of the vote until its petition for a re-
count of 1.25 million ballots could be heard. However, the federal 
district judge later dismissed the injunction and the suit for lack of 
jurisdiction.102 
Illinois was even more hotly contested. Morton flew to Chicago 
to confer with Illinois Republican leaders on recount strategy, “while 
party Treasurer Meade Alcorn announced Nixon would win the 
state.”103 “The Cook County Republican chairman alleged that 
100,000 fraudulent votes had swung Illinois to Kennedy through 
‘systematic’ looting of votes in twelve [Chicago] wards and parts of 
two others.”104 One precinct, virtually deserted because of highway 
demolition activity, reported seventy-nine votes for Kennedy and 
three for Nixon, even though there were less than fifty registered 
voters in the precinct on election day.105 Kennedy won the state by 
9,000 votes, but carried Cook County by an astonishing margin of 
450,000 votes.106 The Illinois recount of 863 precincts was not com-
pleted until December 9, during which Nixon gained 943 votes. Still 
losing after the recount, the Illinois Republicans unsuccessfully peti-
tioned the State Board of Elections for relief. The national party did 
not cease its efforts in Illinois until December 19, when the electoral 
college voted Kennedy as the new president.107 Following the elec-
tion, three people were sent to jail for election-related crimes in 
Cook County and 677 others were indicted before being acquitted 
by Judge John M. Karns, “a Daley crony.”108 
Had Nixon succeeded in reversing Kennedy’s Illinois victory, he 
would have still been four votes shy of an electoral college major-
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 36, at 68. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Greenberg, supra note 94. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
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ity.109 At that point, however, it was thought that southern electors 
might bolt the Kennedy ticket and withhold votes from the Ken-
nedy-Johnson ticket, thus throwing the election into the House of 
Representatives. This scenario was made more plausible by the so-
called southern unpledged elector movement, discussed below. 
2. Hawaii 
In Hawaii, the results were even more dramatic and were not re-
solved until long after the election. Given the factual similarities be-
tween Hawaii in 1960 and Florida in 2000, the facts of Hawaii’s 
situation bear further review.110 Following the election, Hawaii 
originally certified Nixon the winner of the state by a mere 141 votes 
(92,505 for Nixon and 92,364 for Kennedy).111 Democratic Party 
leaders immediately decided to contest the results. As was later re-
ported, “National results were close enough and Republican recount 
demands elsewhere strong enough that they considered it possible 
Hawaii’s three votes might even decide the election.”112 The Democ-
rats alleged a number of flaws in the election that they believed 
would overturn the 141 vote margin. They filed suit in Hawaii Cir-
cuit Court, charging voting irregularities in 198 of Hawaii’s 240 pre-
cincts.113 This included an allegation that although some ballots for 
Kennedy were counted, the poll officials failed to record them on the 
tally sheet.114 The Democrats also alleged that some ballots were 
counted for Nixon despite defects in the marking of the ballots by 
the voters.115 They also argued that there were 235 more votes 
 
 109. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 36, at 69. 
 110. Hawaii’s situation in 1960 is also important in that it provides the primary congres-
sional precedent for congressional procedures for resolving disputes over two competing Cer-
tificates of Ascertainment. See supra notes 38–47 and accompanying text (describing possibility 
of congressional battle over competing Certificates of Ascertainment). 
 111. See A.A. Smyser, How Kennedy Won 1960 Recount in Hawaii, HONOLULU STAR-
BULL., June 8, 1963, at 5. 
 112. Id. If Nixon had been able to hold Hawaii and overturn the result in Illinois, then 
he would have needed only one more electoral college vote to prevail, which could easily have 
come from the unpledged southern electors. See infra notes 126–137 and accompanying text. 
 113. Drew McKillips, Democrats File Recount Suit; Cite Irregularities, HONOLULU 
ADVERTISER, Nov. 23, 1960, at A1. 
 114. Id.; see also Drew McKillips, Judge Indicates Partial Recount to Be Ordered, 
HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Dec. 13, 1960, at A1 (describing affidavit that this error under-
recorded Kennedy’s total by 45 votes). 
 115. McKillips, Judge Indicates Partial Recount, supra note 114 (describing affidavit 
from poll watcher alleging that between seven and nine Nixon ballots were marked with a 
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counted in the presidential contest than were actually cast, and that 
1,283 ballots were entirely unaccounted for in the total tabulation.116 
The presiding judge in the case, Circuit Judge Ronald B. 
Jamieson, ordered a recount in thirty-seven of Hawaii’s precincts, or 
a total of 32,273 votes.117 However, it was impossible to complete 
the recount in time to meet the deadline of December 19, when the 
presidential electors were to meet and cast their votes. Thus, when 
Hawaii’s electors met on December 19, they certified their three 
electoral votes for Nixon and Lodge on the basis of the certified 141 
vote margin they held as of November 28, 1960 when Hawaii’s 
popular vote was initially certified.118 Finding the recount going 
against them, on December 23 a Democratic Party “specimen” or 
sample ballot was found in the ballot bag with all of the proper bal-
lots. The Republicans argued that this evidenced Democratic efforts 
to commit election fraud, and the Republicans demanded that the 
entire state presidential election be declared void.119 The FBI, the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office, and the State Attorney General’s office 
launched an investigation of the incident to determine whether fraud 
occurred as a result of the sample ballot.120 
Nonetheless, the recount continued and Kennedy slowly ate into 
Nixon’s lead. Finally, on December 30 the recount was completed 
 
double “X” in violation of state law). 
 116. McKillips, Democrats File Recount Suit, supra note 113. In yet another eerie paral-
lel to the 2000 presidential election, there were also great concerns in Hawaii that so many 
voters spoiled their ballots during the 1960 election. As Robert G. Dodge, the lawyer in 
charge of the Democratic recount litigation in Hawaii in 1960, observed at the time, “This 
rather staggering number of voters who disenfranchised themselves shows that we should clar-
ify not only the form of the ballot, but also liberalize the manner in which we vote.” Charles 
Turner, 2,342 Ballots Are Ruled Invalid—But Kennedy Legal Isle Winner, HONOLULU 
ADVERTISER, Dec. 29, 1960, at A1. In one precinct on Kauai, there were 58 invalid ballots out 
of 950 votes cast, or one invalid vote for every 16.5 voters in the precinct, a ratio that the pre-
siding judge deemed an “amazing number” of rejected ballots. See Recount Ordered in 7 
More Precincts, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Dec. 16, 1960, at 1B. 
 117. McKillips, Judge Indicates Partial Recount, supra note 114, at page A1. Eventually, 
the recount was extended to an additional seven more precincts, and finally a recount of all 
precincts was ordered. See Smyser, supra note 111. 
 118. See 107 CONG. REC. 289 (1961) (reproducing first certified slate of electors from 
state of Hawaii from December 19, 1960). Hawaii’s Democratic electors transmitted a second 
certificate of ascertainment on the same date, but it was believed to be without legal effect as 
the Acting Governor had certified the Republican certificate. See Smyser, supra note 111. 
 119. Drew McKillips, “Specimen” Revealed by Recount, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Dec. 
23, 1960, at A1. 
 120. Id. 
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and the court ruled that Kennedy had carried Hawaii by 115 
votes.121 On January 4, 1961 the new Governor of Hawaii transmit-
ted a second Certificate of Ascertainment on behalf of the state, re-
porting that as a result of the lawsuit and recounts, Hawaii’s electoral 
votes were to be recorded for Kennedy rather than Nixon.122 
Congress convened on January 6, 1961, to count the electoral 
votes. Ironically, Nixon, as Vice-President, was the presiding officer 
over the vote counting process.123 When it came time to report Ha-
waii’s votes, Nixon asked for unanimous consent that the Kennedy 
electors be counted.124 In so doing, Nixon averted a confrontation 
on the floor of the House. Hawaii’s Democratic Senator Oren E. 
Long and its Democratic Representative Daniel K. Inouye were pre-
pared to object to the count if the Nixon certificate were counted 
rather than the Kennedy certificate.125 
3. Southern unpledged elector movement 
Further complicating the 1960 presidential election, as well as 
the context for interpreting the debates over the Act in 1963, was 
the so-called “unpledged elector movement” that blossomed in the 
American South during the 1950s and 1960s. The southern un-
pledged elector movement grew out of the 1948 Dixiecrat move-
ment, which generated over one million votes and thirty-nine elec-
toral votes for Strom Thurmond, then the South Carolina Governor. 
 
 121. See Lum v. Bush, Civ. No. 7029 (Haw. 1st Cir. Ct. Dec. 30, 1960), reproduced at 
107 CONG. REC. 290 (1961) . 
 122. 107 CONG. REC. 290. 
 123. The same was true for Vice-President Gore in the 2000 election. 
 124. 107 CONG. REC. 290. Nixon specified that this was done “[i]n order not to delay 
the further count of the electoral vote . . . [and] without the intent of establishing a prece-
dent.” Id.; see also DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ch. 10, § 
3.5 (1977). 
 125. As one news story reported the events: 
Long and Inouye came to the joint session carrying folders of documents to support 
their pro-Kennedy arguments, and Hawaii’s Republican Senator Hiram L. Fong said 
he wouldn’t dispute the Kennedy vote. 
  When the joint session convened, Inouye seated himself in front of a micro-
phone, opened his folder and motioned to his colleagues that he was prepared to 
present his objection.  
  When Nixon came to Hawaii in the state-by-state roll call, Long also opened 
his folder containing the Kennedy certificate and showed the impressive document 
to his fellow Senators. 
Kennedy Is Proclaimed President by Congress, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Jan. 6, 1961, at 1-A. 
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Animated by opposition to the national Democratic Party’s position 
on integration, the Dixiecrats stormed out of the 1948 Democratic 
Convention, determined to run their own segregationist candi-
date.126 Although Thurmond had little chance of winning, the South 
hoped that he could deny Harry S. Truman an electoral college ma-
jority, thereby throwing the election into the House of Representa-
tives. In the House, loyal Democrats would have controlled twenty-
one delegations, Republicans twenty, and the Dixiecrats four, 
thereby giving them controlling influence over the outcome and 
enabling them to extract concessions in exchange for supporting a 
candidate. Truman’s electoral college majority headed off this sce-
nario, but he carried California by only 8,933 votes and Ohio by 
3,554 votes. Had he lost those two states to Dewey, the race would 
have been thrown into the House of Representatives, just as the Dix-
iecrats hoped.127 
The subsequent election of conservative Dwight Eisenhower to 
the White House in 1952 temporarily quelled the southern political 
movement, but the nomination of Northeastern Catholic Kennedy 
in 1960 triggered concern in the Democratic Party in the South.128 
Rather than running their own candidate, as they had done in 1948, 
in 1960 the southern states formed the so-called southern unpledged 
elector movement.129 The cornerstone of the movement was the fact 
that the Constitution places no specific limits on the candidate for 
whom an elector may vote; unless state law otherwise instructs, an 
elector remains free to vote his conscience. Most states have long re-
quired electors to vote for the candidate for whom they are pledged, 
and award their electoral votes to the candidate who receives the 
largest number of electoral votes in their state. Even if electors are 
not formally constrained by state law, however, they almost invaria-
bly vote for the candidate for whom they are pledged, except for the 
rare circumstance of a faithless elector.130 
 
 126. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 36, at 59–63. 
 127. Truman also carried Illinois by only 16,807 votes. Had he lost Illinois, Ohio, and 
California—a swing of only 24,294 votes total, Dewey would have won an outright electoral 
college majority. Id. at 62. 
 128. Kennedy’s nomination of southerner Lyndon Johnson of Texas as his running-mate 
likely averted a wholesale defection of the southern states from the Kennedy column, thereby 
salvaging the election for Kennedy. Id. at 64. 
 129. Id. at 65. 
 130. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing faithless electors). 
3ZYW.DOC 3/5/02  8:34 PM 
1573] The Law of Presidential Transitions 
 1613 
During the 1960 election, however, electors in Mississippi and 
Alabama specifically sought election as unpledged electors, thereby 
retaining the right to vote their preferences, rather than pledging 
themselves to a specific candidate. In Alabama the ballots listed only 
the names of the individual electors for the various parties, and made 
no mention of the actual presidential candidates, Kennedy and 
Nixon.131 There had been stiff competition in Alabama to determine 
who would be placed on the ballot as Democratic electors—those 
pledged to support the party’s national nominee or unpledged elec-
tors opposed to the national policies of the party. A primary and 
runoff in the spring had resulted in selection of six unpledged and 
five Democratic loyalist electoral candidates. Mississippi elected eight 
unpledged electors.132 Most of the remaining southern states voted 
for Nixon. 
On December 10, 1960, Alabaman’s six unpledged electors met 
and announced that they would cast their votes “for an outstanding 
Southern Democrat who sympathizes with our peculiar problems in 
the South.”133 They also announced, “our position remains fluid so 
that we can cooperate with other unpledged electors for the preser-
vation of racial and national integrity,” and lashed out at those 
Southern Democrats who continued to support Kennedy.134 On De-
cember 12 the Alabama unpledged electors met with Mississippi’s 
unpledged electors and agreed to throw their unpledged elector sup-
port to Senator Byrd of Virginia. They also drafted a joint statement 
calling on presidential electors from other states to bolt to Byrd, in 
the hope that enough electoral votes might be withheld from Ken-
nedy to deprive him an electoral college majority and thereby throw 
the dispute into the House of Representatives. Once the election was 
in the House, the southerners hoped that all southern delegations 
would vote for Byrd and Republicans would join them in order to 
ensure Kennedy’s defeat.135 
 
 131. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 36, at 284–85 (showing Alabama ballot). 
 132. Id. at 69. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. The new House party lineup had twenty-three states controlled by northern and 
border state Democrats, seventeen controlled by Republicans, and six controlled by Deep 
South Democrats. Four delegations were evenly split between the parties. Id. at 69. As noted 
above, the Republicans held out their own hopes that the Southern Democrats would throw 
their support to Nixon. 
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In the end, the Alabama and Mississippi unpledged electors 
failed to peel-off any other Democrats from the Kennedy ticket. The 
only additional Byrd vote they picked-up was from one Henry D. 
Irwin, a faithless Nixon elector from Oklahoma. In the days after the 
election, Irwin had telegraphed all Republican electors with a plan. 
Noting that there were insufficient Republican electoral votes to 
deny Kennedy the election, Irwin suggested that the Republicans 
abandon Nixon and join forces with southern Democratic electors to 
elect Byrd as President with Barry Goldwater as Vice President.136 
Irwin received many replies, several of them favorable, but they 
stated that they had a moral obligation to vote for Nixon. Irwin sub-
sequently asked the Republican National Committee members and 
state chairman to free Republican electors from their obligations to 
vote for Nixon, but he had little success. 
Although the southern unpledged electors failed to tip the bal-
ance in the 1960 election, their impact was significant. Moreover, as 
will be explained below, this long-forgotten incident cast a long 
shadow over both the debates and drafting of the Presidential Tran-
sition Act in 1963.137 
C. Implications of Legislative and Political History 
Testifying before Congress on December 4, 2000, David Bar-
ram, the Administrator of the GSA, described the 2000 election as 
an “unprecedented, incredibly close, and intensely contested elec-
tion, with legal action being pursued by both sides.”138 The historical 
context described above belies this statement. The 1960 election—
the election conducted immediately prior to the Act’s passage—was 
extraordinarily close and litigation and recounts continued for weeks 
after the election. California and Hawaii both switched columns for 
the candidates, and Hawaii’s recount was not completed until Janu-
ary 4, 1961. Investigations of vote fraud in several large states perse-
vered into mid-December, threatening to overturn the results in 
those states. The combination of unpledged and faithless electors 
that eventually generated fifteen electoral votes for Harry Byrd 
threatened to upset Kennedy’s electoral college majority and actually 
 
 136. Id. at 70. In the electoral college, Irwin voted Byrd for President and Goldwater for 
Vice President. The southern unpledged electors voted for Strom Thurmond as Vice President. 
 137. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 138. Barram Testimony, supra note 13. 
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undid his popular majority. 
Despite all of this uncertainty about who might eventually be the 
actual winner of the 1960 election, Congressman Fascell stated 
(without objection) to the House that there was no problem ascer-
taining the “apparent winner.”139 The only scenario that fits with this 
historical context is that the drafters of the Act recognized the possi-
bility that in some elections the apparent winner conceivably could 
turn out not to be the actual winner. Thus, even though Kennedy 
had some important state victories overturned (in California), Nixon 
actually lost a state that was certified to him (Hawaii), and still others 
states remained in doubt for weeks after the election, this does not 
change the fact that Kennedy was easily ascertainable as the apparent 
winner long before there could be any confidence that he was going 
to be the actual winner of the election. A standard rooted in a bu-
reaucrat’s subjective intuition of the various possible scenarios that 
may have developed is not consistent with this history. The only co-
herent understanding must be that Kennedy was able to claim a cer-
tified electoral college majority notwithstanding the independent 
electors. Despite the real threat that the electoral college majority 
might later be overturned, that did not make it difficult to ascertain 
Kennedy as the apparent winner. 
This turbulent history casts substantial doubt specifically on the 
position taken by the Administrator in the 2000 presidential elec-
tion. Recall that he originally articulated two factual explanations for 
his purported inability to recognize George W. Bush as the Presi-
dent-elect for purposes of the Act.140 First, he argued that he could 
not recognize an apparent winner until all of the outstanding litiga-
tion associated with the election was completed. Second, he stated 
that he would not recognize a President-elect until either Bush or 
Gore conceded the election. Both of these rationales are inconsistent 
with what actually occurred in the 1960 election that shaped the 
views of the Act’s drafters on this point. Whatever factors the 
Administrator relied upon in making his decision, it is clear that the 
two that he articulated were uniquely poor choices in that they had 
been squarely considered and rejected by the authors of the Act. 
 
 139. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 140. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text. The Administrator later announced a 
third factor, which will be discussed infra Part IV. 
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1. Resolution of uncertainty 
First, given the historical backdrop of the 1960 election, it is ab-
surd to believe that when the drafters wrote the Act in 1963 that 
they intended that it would prevent the Administrator from ascer-
taining an apparent winner until all litigation and recounts were 
complete. As just described, litigation and recounts continued fol-
lowing the 1960 election throughout December and even into Janu-
ary 1961 before all of the electoral votes were finally settled. Pivotal 
states such as New Jersey, Illinois, and Texas were still deciding elec-
tion-related litigation up to and beyond the time when the Electors 
were to meet to cast their ballots. Had Illinois’s election results been 
reversed, then there would have been great uncertainty about the 
eventual result of the election, especially when combined with the 
unpredictability spawned by the Hawaii recount and the southern 
unpledged elector movement. Given this context, it is simply implau-
sible that the drafters of the Act believed that an apparent winner 
could not be ascertained while litigation and election contests were 
still being conducted. If so, it certainly would not have been as easy 
to determine the apparent winner as Fascell stated that it was. 
The Administrator’s argument that he could not ascertain a win-
ner until all litigation was complete is troubling in that it allows the 
losing candidate or losing party to extend the period of election un-
certainty indefinitely simply by filing lawsuits and recount requests 
throughout the country. Indeed, just by bringing legal action or 
seeking a recount in California, Texas, and New York, a candidate 
could place almost any election into doubt. Simply by keeping litiga-
tion ongoing, a sore loser candidate or party could dramatically un-
dermine the transition efforts of the winning candidate by indefi-
nitely postponing the declaration of a President-elect under the Act. 
Third-party and fringe candidates would seemingly have drastic abil-
ity to disrupt the recognition of a President-elect in a timely manner. 
There is no reason to believe that Congress intended for this to oc-
cur. Indeed, it is evident that Congress meant for the transition to 
begin as soon as possible after the election. The Act’s emphasis on 
speed and bright-line rules for ascertaining the apparent winner indi-
cates that Congress did not intend for this declaration to be held 
hostage to a possible sore loser candidate seeking to delay the vic-
tor’s transition. It is unlikely that the drafters of the Act intended a 
result so counter-productive to the Act’s policies. 
Alternatively, the Administrator will be required to estimate the 
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likely results of all the ongoing litigation in order to determine the 
degree to which it raises the possibility of overturning the election 
results.141 This too is an improbable interpretation. There is simply 
no reason to believe that Congress intended for the GSA Administra-
tor to be in this position, nor is there any reason to believe that the 
GSA Administrator will have the competence or expertise to make 
such an evaluation. As noted, David Barram was an executive for 
Apple Computer and Hewlett-Packard before taking over at GSA. 
There is little in his background to suggest that he was qualified to 
make the determination required by the Act. Moreover, the ascer-
tainment of the apparent winner is a largely ministerial function, not 
a free-ranging inquiry into the likelihood of one candidate or the 
other prevailing on the merits of various litigation being conducted 
throughout the country at any one time. Thus, it is even less plausi-
ble to believe that Congress meant for the President-elect’s transition 
to be held hostage by the subjective assessments of the GSA Admin-
istrator as to the merits of the various lawsuits that might be pending 
for months after the election. 
Indeed, as discussed above, had Barram conducted an inquiry 
about the likelihood that the litigation might overturn the result of 
the election, he would have soon recognized that this was unlikely. 
Barram’s belief that the results of the litigation might actually affect 
the results of the election demonstrates more his unsuitability for ex-
ercising the discretion he claimed to possess than it demonstrates the 
propriety of withholding a decision until the final resolution of litiga-
tion. As noted above, Gore had no conceivable possibility of prevail-
ing as the winning candidate in the election once the state of Florida 
initially certified its electoral votes to Bush. Thus, had the Adminis-
trator actually made an informed and reasoned evaluation of the 
situation, it would have been obvious that Bush would have been the 
prevailing candidate in the end. Given the virtual impossibility of a 
Gore victory in the election, the Administrator was simply mistaken 
in believing that the outcome of the Florida litigation could have ac-
tually affected the outcome of the election. Thus, even if the Admin-
 
 141. See Turley Testimony, supra note 73 (“Congress was aware that controversies could 
clearly continue until six days before the voting of the electoral college. Congress was further 
aware that challenges to the results could occur in any state. It chose not to wait for the period 
for controversies to be concluded in authorizing the release of transition funds and support. 
Yet, under Mr. Barram’s interpretation, the Administrator must make a personal judgment as 
to the merits of litigation that could affect any critical state.”). 
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istrator was waiting for a resolution of all relevant uncertainty regard-
ing the outcome of the election, he still should have recognized 
Bush as the apparent winner once Florida’s electoral votes were certi-
fied for him. The probability that Gore might actually win the elec-
tion was thus comparable to the other scenarios described above that 
might intervene between the election and the electoral college vote, 
such as recounts or faithless electors who upset an election. Indeed, 
one is tempted to observe that it is precisely to avoid errors like this 
that administrative discretion is usually provided only to officers who 
actually have expertise in the subject area relevant to the delegation. 
This is also why it is to be assumed that in general Congress would 
have desired to insulate ministerial officers such as the Administrator 
of the GSA from the political pressures that surely influenced his de-
cision-making in this situation. 
2. Need for a concession 
It is true that Nixon, unlike Gore, conceded early on in the 1960 
election, but there is no reason to believe that the Act’s authors 
thought that this difference would constitute a legally-relevant dis-
tinction under the Act. There is nothing in either the legislative his-
tory of the Act or the Act itself to imply that the lack of a concession 
would be relevant in any way to the triggering of the Act. Obviously, 
if one candidate did concede an election, this would be relevant to 
determining an apparent winner. But the absence of a concession 
cannot be a valid basis for refusing to act. The failure to concede an 
election is simply too prone to manipulation and strategic behavior 
to be a reliable factor on which to rely in administering the Act. 
Nor is it a plausible interpretation to believe that one candidate 
must concede before an apparent winner can be ascertained. Using 
this standard would be even more troubling than the “end of litiga-
tion” standard as far as carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under 
this standard, a losing candidate could simply refuse to concede the 
election until the electoral college met. During that period it would 
be impossible to declare an apparent winner. Congress certainly 
could not have intended such an irrational application of the Act. 
A concession has no legally binding effect in an election, nor 
should it have any legal effect for application of the Act. Assume, for 
instance, that after Nixon conceded the 1960 election Republican 
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operatives succeeded in overturning enough electoral votes to win 
the election for him.142 In fact it is argued that Nixon purposely con-
ceded on one hand but implicitly endorsed the contest efforts on the 
other, simply so that he could attempt to overturn the election re-
sults without being perceived as a sore loser if he was unsuccessful, 
thereby preserving his future political viability.143 Did the concession 
mean that Nixon could not be the President-elect (or President, for 
that matter), or that Nixon’s concession had the constitutional con-
sequence of making Kennedy President? Of course not. What if the 
election were thrown into the House of Representatives? Would 
Nixon have been ineligible to be named President-elect? What if 
Nixon conceded, but Byrd did not? The election results exist in an 
objective reality independent of whether a candidate subjectively 
concedes the election under the Act; the status of President-elect 
similarly exists in a reality independent of a candidate’s concession. 
But again, the reality as to who is the actual winner is different from 
the Act’s inquiry as to which candidate is the apparent winner. 
Similarly, assume that Al Gore had carried through with his elec-
tion-night plan to concede, only to learn the next day that he might 
win (or might have won) the Presidency. The concession would have 
had no legal effect whatsoever. For instance, there was important 
litigation being conducted in Florida where, for political reasons, Al 
Gore was not a party, just as Nixon was not a party to the 1960 elec-
tion litigation. This litigation was being conducted solely in the 
name of Florida voters and the Florida Democratic Party—just as the 
efforts on behalf of Nixon were conducted in the name of the RNC 
and various state actors.144 However, it is obvious that Gore, like 
Nixon in 1960, knew of the litigation, did nothing to deter it, and 
 
 142. Such success could include: overturning the Illinois and Texas results on the basis of 
fraud, winning the New Jersey recount, or peeling off a sufficient number of unpledged or 
faithless southern Democratic electors. 
 143. See Posner, supra note 92; Greenberg, supra note 94. In fact, as Posner and Green-
berg observe, Nixon played this dual strategy flawlessly, as he was able to probe for opportuni-
ties to contest the election results, but at the same time preserve the now well-varnished legend 
of selflessness that Posner and Greenberg set out to discredit. In fact, the revisionist history 
that Nixon had conceded nobly in 1960 helped him avoid the sore loser label and thereby 
paved the way for his eventual ascension to the presidency in 1968. 
 144. For instance, Gore was not formally a party to litigation that challenged the validity 
of certain absentee military ballots because of the negative political implications that would 
result from taking such a position. Nonetheless, Gore did nothing to deter this litigation and 
obviously would have accepted the results if the litigation had resulted in the disqualification of 
these ballots. 
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would have accepted the results had they benefited him. In short, 
the notion of waiting for a candidate to concede the election is not 
only inconsistent with the purposes of the Act, but it proposes a 
standard that simply makes no sense within the context of the Act. 
In fact, Gore did concede to Bush late on election night, only to 
retract it that same night. What if he had waited a week before re-
tracting it? What if he conceded privately to Bush but not publicly? 
What if he intended to concede but was incapacitated for some rea-
son and unable to do so? What if he had conceded both privately to 
Bush and publicly, only to retract it? Would Bush have been the 
President-elect under the Act for that week, only to lose the designa-
tion when Gore recanted? Indeed, was Bush eligible for the transi-
tion resources during the brief period between Gore’s early-morning 
concession and subsequent retraction? Although these questions may 
seem fanciful, they point up the absurdity of relying on a concession 
by one of the candidates to identify an apparent winner. Surely Con-
gress did not intend that the statute’s designation of the President-
elect would be controlled by the losing candidate’s decision of 
whether and when to concede the election. Waiting for a concession 
is simply too imprecise and too subjective of a standard to be consis-
tent with the statute. Congress must have meant for some more ob-
jective criteria to guide the determination. 
Thus, the available legislative history reinforces the plain lan-
guage of the statute in concluding that the designation of Florida’s 
electors by the Florida Governor made Bush the “apparent winning 
candidate” of the election by giving him 271 certified and pledged 
electors. At that time it was certainly possible to imagine numerous 
scenarios that might result in Bush not being the actual winning 
candidate, just as there were contingencies that may have resulted in 
Nixon overtaking Kennedy in the 1960 election. For instance, some 
electors could conceivably turn out to be faithless electors, breaking 
their pledges to vote for Bush and thereby throwing the election into 
Congress or giving a majority of electoral votes to Al Gore. Ballot 
recounts or post-election litigation might result in Bush losing elec-
toral votes that were previously pledged or certified to him, as Nixon 
did with Hawaii in 1960. Recounts or absentee ballots could throw 
states back into play that were thought to be resolved. Nonetheless, 
these contingencies did not change the fact that Bush was the appar-
ent winning candidate when he secured a majority of pledged and 
certified electoral votes, even though he may not have eventually 
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turned out to be the actual winning candidate of the election. Simi-
larly, it is possible that Kennedy’s 1960 victory may have been over-
turned in the face of allegations of vote fraud in Illinois and else-
where. Nonetheless, Kennedy was the apparent successful candidate 
the day after the 1960 election and George W. Bush was the appar-
ent successful candidate from the time Florida certified its electoral 
votes in his favor. 
IV. THE ADMINISTRATOR’S RELIANCE ON THE 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
In the closing weeks of the election controversy, the Administra-
tor adopted a third position. He argued that he actually had no dis-
cretion to release the transition funds, and that in fact, the legislative 
history of the Act instructed him not to release the transition funds 
in a “close” election, which he interpreted as applying to the 2000 
election. He believed that while the litigation and recounts in Florida 
were still pending, he had discretion to withhold the transition re-
sources. He rested his case on a few isolated clips of legislative his-
tory. As this part of the essay indicates, his reliance on this legislative 
history is misplaced. When placed in the larger historical and legisla-
tive context, it is evident that the Administrator misinterpreted the 
meaning of these legislative snippets. In fact, once the statements are 
placed in their proper context, it is apparent that their true meaning 
is consistent with the argument advanced in this essay. 
Testifying before Congress in early December, Administrator 
David Barram stated: 
The Presidential Transition Act of 1963 makes it my responsibility 
to “ascertain” the “apparent successful candidates” for President 
and Vice President before the funds, services and facilities author-
ized by the Act become available to the Transition Team. While the 
Act gives no explicit criteria or deadlines for making this ascertain-
ment, as the legislative history demonstrates, Congress made it per-
fectly clear that if there is “any question” of who the winner is “in a 
close contest” this determination should not be made.145 
He rested his interpretation of Congressional intent on three ex-
cerpts from the floor debates on the bill. Here is his argument in full: 
 
 
 145. Barram Testimony, supra note 13. 
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As Representative Fascell explained during the 1963 discussion of 
the bill, “in a close contest, the Administrator simply would not 
make the decision.” 109 CONG. REC. 12238 (July 25, 1963). Rep-
resentative Fascell went on to explain that “[t]here is nothing in 
the act that requires the Administrator to make a decision which is 
[sic] in his own judgment he could not make. If he could not de-
termine the apparent successful candidate, he would not authorize 
the expenditure of funds to anyone; and he should not,” id, “[i]n 
the whole history of the United States there have only been three 
close such situations. It is an unlikely proposition, but if it were to 
happen, if the Administrator had any question in his mind, he sim-
ply would not make any designation in order to make the services 
available as provided by the Act. If as an intelligent human being 
and he has a doubt, he would not act until a decision has been 
made in the electoral college or in the Congress.” Id. at 13349.146 
The Administrator’s reliance on these shards of legislative history 
was misplaced. He failed to take account of the specific legislative 
and historical context in which the statements were uttered, and thus 
simply misinterprets their significance. Each of these statements must 
be considered in turn. 
A. The Problem of “Close” Electoral Contests 
The first two statements by Congressman Fascell both occur in a 
discrete colloquy with Congressman H.R. Gross and will be treated 
together. Gross asked Fascell, “We apparently have a situation grow-
ing up in certain States of the Union whereby there may be inde-
pendent electors. Does not the gentleman think that those desig-
nated as President and Vice President by the present Administrator 
of General Services would be given psychological and other advan-
tages by designating them as President and Vice President?”147 To 
this query Fascell provided the reply quoted by the Administrator in 
his testimony, “I do not think so, because if they were unable at that 
time to determine the successful candidates, this act would not be 
operative. Therefore, in a close contest, the Administrator simply 
would not make the decision.” 
It is clear in this context that Fascell was not referring to the type 
of “close contest” that prevailed in the 2000 election. Instead, he re-
 
 146. Id. at n.1. 
 147. 109 CONG. REC. 13,348 (1963) (statement of Mr. Gross). 
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ferred to the type of close contest that suggested by the 1960 elec-
tion, where the presence of southern unpledged electors might raise 
questions about whether a candidate actually held a certified elec-
toral college majority, even if his party appeared to hold an electoral 
college majority.148 It is clear that Fascell and Gross were not talking 
about the possibility that subsequent litigation, recounts, or other 
post-election activity might have the result of undoing an electoral 
college majority in a “close” election. Rather, they emphasized pro-
tecting the prerogatives of unpledged electors to exercise their inde-
pendent judgment. 
Representative Gross then criticized the Act for failing to make 
an explicit exception for this particular situation, as he believed that 
the Act compels the Administrator to designate an apparent winner 
notwithstanding the fact that many electors might actually be un-
pledged electors. Gross observed that the Act makes no exception for 
a situation where unpledged electors hold the potentially deciding 
votes in an election, and that the Act says “that the Administrator 
shall do thus and so. . . . It says he shall make the determination, 
does it not?”149 Gross was concerned that the Act provided a manda-
tory requirement that the Administrator designate a President-elect, 
and in so doing infringed on the rights of independent electors. To 
this criticism Fascell provided the second comment relied upon by 
the Administrator: “There is nothing in the act that requires the 
Administrator to make a decision which in his own judgment he 
could not make. If he could not determine the apparent successful 
candidate, he would not authorize the expenditure of funds to any-
one; and he should not.”150 Read in context, this colloquy clearly in-
dicates if a candidate cannot be confidently said to have an electoral 
college majority because some of his party’s electors are actually un-
pledged electors, then the Administrator should not designate an ap-
parent successful candidate. 
Gross then complained that even if the designation of a Presi-
dent-elect is not compelled in such a situation, the Act vests discre-
tion in the Administrator to anoint a President-elect, even if so doing 
would be premature under the facts because of the presence of un-
pledged electors. Moreover, Gross was concerned that the Adminis-
 
 148. See supra notes 126–37 and accompanying text. 
 149. 109 CONG. REC. 13,348 (statement of Mr. Gross) (emphasis added). 
 150. Id. (statement of Mr. Fascell) (emphasis added). 
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trator would intentionally use this power in an improper manner to 
recognize a President-elect and thereby undermine the independence 
of the unpledged electors. In response to Fascell’s admonition that 
the statute does not compel the Administrator to ascertain an appar-
ent winner under these circumstances, Gross objected, “Well, it 
could be whoever he thought was the apparent winner; is that not 
correct?”151 To which Fascell responded, “It could be—yes.”152 In 
response Gross further objected, “Yes. Of course, that is all the au-
thority he needs—whoever he thinks is the apparent winner—that is 
all—without waiting for the college of electors to meet and cast the 
official ballots as provided for in the Constitution.”153 In response to 
this interrogation by Gross, Fascell objected: 
I do not see any great big problem in the Administrator of the 
General Services Administration being unduly involved in the mat-
ter of determining who is the apparent winner in order to perform 
the ministerial functions under this act. . . . The gentleman previ-
ously pointed out in the last election [1960] we had one that was 
as close as we would want to have an election and nobody had any 
trouble in deciding who was the apparent winner.154 
The import of this exchange may need some elaboration, as it 
again relies on an understanding of historical context. Gross was a 
leading Taft-Goldwater Republican in the 1950s and 1960s. It is 
likely that he sought to protect the prerogative of unpledged electors 
both on principle as well as political advantage.155 He did not appear 
to be concerned that an Administrator would misuse the power in a 
close election to designate either the Democratic or Republican can-
didate. What he was more likely concerned about was intra-party de-
bate, primarily the intra-Democratic Party debate over the status of 
unpledged electors. To be more concrete, he was probably con-
cerned about the upcoming 1964 election, where it was conceivable 
that a growing number of southern states would elect unpledged 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. (emphasis added). 
 154. Id. 
 155. The emphasis here is on political considerations, but this should not be read to 
denigrate the role of principle in Congressman Gross’s thinking. Contemporaries recognized 
Gross as a sincere believer in federalism and strict construction of the Constitution; thus, he 
would have been inclined to support the constitutional prerogatives of electoral college voters 
to vote their consciences. 
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electors rather than Kennedy electors. Kennedy was not assassinated 
until the Fall of 1963, but the debates over the Act took place in July 
of 1963, thus Kennedy was expected to be the Democratic nominee 
for reelection in 1964 when these congressional debates took 
place.156 At the time the Act was being debated, conservative Barry 
Goldwater had already been identified as a possible Republican 
nominee to challenge Kennedy.157 At the same time, the southern 
states were embroiled in ongoing controversy with Kennedy over his 
civil rights polices.158 Kennedy was thus quite vulnerable in the 
South, and it would have been reasonable for Republicans to believe 
that Goldwater might be successful in claiming any unpledged 
southern electors.159 As a purely political matter, therefore, conserva-
tive Republicans such as Gross would be expected to be quite ada-
mant about protecting the prerogatives of unpledged southern elec-
tors. Moreover, if the unpledged elector movement in fact expanded 
across the South, it was foreseeable that the general election might 
produce a majority of Democratic electors, but not necessarily a ma-
jority of Kennedy electors. In such a situation, Gross was concerned 
that the GSA Administrator—a political appointee of the incumbent 
Kennedy administration, of course—would be permitted to recog-
nize the unpledged Democratic Party electors as Kennedy electors 
and thereby designate Kennedy the apparent winner even though he 
would lack an electoral college majority. Had the Act been in place 
in 1960, for instance, the GSA Administrator could have tried to 
count the unpledged Democratic electors for Kennedy and declared 
him the President-elect. This is the likely explanation for Gross’s re-
peated concern that the Act allows the GSA Administrator to desig-
 
 156. In fact, Gross implies that he believes that the real purpose of the Act was to benefit 
Kennedy. He stated, 
Let me ask the gentleman [Fascell] this question which intrigues me in connection 
with the political aspects of this thing. The last sentence of the report on page 12 
reads: Enactment of these proposals—says President John F. Kennedy—will go a 
long way to improve the political climate. What political climate is being improved 
by this legislation? 
See 109 CONG. REC. 13,348 (statement of Mr. Gross). 
 157. Goldwater and Nelson Rockefeller of New York were the front-runners for the Re-
publican nomination as early as January 1963. See RICHARD REEVES, PRESIDENT KENNEDY: 
PROFILE OF POWER 452 (1993). 
 158. See id. at 625–26. In fact, in the 1960 election Kennedy had won only thirty-seven 
percent of the vote in Mississippi against Nixon and the unpledged electoral slate. Id. at 355. 
 159. Recall that under Irwin’s rogue 1960 ticket designed to pick up the unpledged 
southern electors, Byrd was the choice for president and Goldwater for vice president. 
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nate “whoever he thinks is the apparent winner” as the apparent 
winner. The concern here was not with the factual difficulty of ascer-
taining the apparent winner in a close election, as the GSA Adminis-
trator claimed during the 2000 election. The issue was that despite 
the absence of a certified electoral college majority for Kennedy, the 
Administrator would allow political considerations to intervene and 
thereby interpret unpledged electors Kennedy electors.160 
Gross also obviously feared that the Administrator would have 
the power to make a wholly subjective recognition of an apparent 
winner in the election, such as by counting unpledged Democratic 
electors to be Kennedy electors. It was feared that this would create 
psychological pressure on the unpledged electors to tow the Democ-
ratic party line and follow the Administrator’s lead, thereby render-
ing their electoral college vote a fait accompli and sacrificing their 
independence. This would also limit their ability to throw their votes 
to Goldwater or to a Southern Democrat who could deny Kennedy 
an electoral college majority. Given his concerns, Gross would pre-
sumably have been equally appalled at the subjective nature of the 
decisions made by the Administrator in the 2000 election in refusing 
to recognize Bush’s certified electoral college majority. 
This colloquy also undermines a related argument made by the 
Clinton administration during the 2000 election. White House 
spokesman Jake Siewert referred to this legislative history at a press 
conference, claiming that that it indicated that the Administrator was 
not permitted to designate an apparent winner in a “close election” 
because doing so would create a psychological edge for one candi-
date or the other “in a contested election.”161 Siewart implied that 
this would provide a psychological edge in public opinion. This is 
not a correct interpretation of the legislative statement on which 
Siewert relies. There is no reference in the floor debates to giving a 
psychological edge in a “contested” election. Read in context, the 
 
 160. In fact, Gross seems to have had particular concerns about Kennedy himself using 
his power as the incumbent President to use the GSA designation in exactly this way. 109 
CONG. REC. 13,348. 
 161. Siewert, supra note 85. Paul Light also defended the refusal of the Administrator to 
release the transition resources in part on the ground that designating Bush the apparent win-
ner would provide an improper psychological edge. See Transitioning to a New Administra-
tion: Can the Next President be Ready?: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 
Subcomm. on Gov’t Mgmt., Info., and Tech. (Dec. 4, 2000) (statement of Paul Light), avail-
able at http://www.house.gov/reform/gmit/hearings/2000hearings/001204.Transition/ 
001204pl.htm [hereinafter Light Testimony].  
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floor debates refer to the application of psychological pressure on 
unpledged electors. Again, the entire debate over the designation of 
an apparent winner under the Act returns to central, verifiable ques-
tion of whether one candidate has achieved an electoral college ma-
jority and the difficulty of determining this when some electors may 
be nominally Democratic but actually unpledged electors. Thus, nei-
ther of the first two excerpts relied upon by the Administrator sup-
port his belief that he is not empowered to make a designation in a 
“close” election. 
B. Three Such Close Elections 
Consider the Administrator’s final source of purported authority 
for the discretion to refuse to ascertain an apparent winner in a 
“close” election such as the 2000 election. In response to a question 
by Congressman Haley, Fascell observed that there had only been 
three such close elections, and that: 
In the whole history of the United States there have only been 
three close such situations. It is an unlikely proposition, but if it 
were to happen, if the administrator had any question in his mind, 
he simply would not make any designation in order to make the 
services available as provided by the act. If as an intelligent human 
being and he has a doubt, he would not act until a decision has 
been made in the electoral college or in the Congress.162 
An examination of the “three close such situations” referenced 
by Fascell indicates that he clearly understood a “close” election to 
be one in which it was impossible to ascertain a certified electoral 
college winner. Although he did not identify the three elections to 
which he refers, he probably meant the elections of 1800, 1824, and 
1876.163 These elections were fundamentally different from the 2000 
election, however, in that in each it was impossible to establish a 
winner until the election was actually resolved in the electoral college 
or in the House of Representatives. Thus, the focus on these elec-
tions in the legislative history actually proves the opposite of what 
the Administrator claimed. They demonstrate that even though the 
2000 election was a close election in common parlance, the 2000 
election was not a “close” election within the understanding of the 
 
 162. 109 CON. REC. 13,349. 
 163. See Light Testimony, supra note 161. 
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Act’s drafters, the type of election where an apparent winner could 
not be ascertained. An examination of these “three close such” elec-
tions indicates that the 2000 election was close in a layman’s sense of 
the term, but not in the sense in which the Act’s authors used the 
term. Thus, even though the 1960 or 2000 election might be 
thought of as a “close” election, they were not “close” in the sense 
used by the Act because there would be no difficulty in ascertaining 
an apparent winner of the election, even though the identity of the 
eventual actual winner might remain in question for some time. The 
three “close” presidential elections referred to by Fascell, by contrast, 
were elections where no apparent winner could be identified because 
no certified electoral college winner could be identified. Of course, 
there was no Presidential Transition Act during the time of these 
elections; nonetheless, Fascell’s reference to those elections provides 
guidance as to what types of elections he considered to be “close” 
elections for purposes of the Act’s definition. 
In 1800, for instance, there was an electoral college tie between 
Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr, thus requiring resolution of the 
election in the House of Representatives.164 At that time, prior to the 
enactment the Twelfth Amendment, electors did not vote separately 
for the President and Vice President, but rather had two votes each, 
with the candidate receiving the largest number of votes elected 
President and the second-highest candidate becoming Vice Presi-
dent. To account for this, the Democratic-Republicans should have 
arranged for one Burr voter to cast his vote for an alternative candi-
date.165 Thus, the problem in the election of 1800 was that under 
the pre-Twelfth Amendment rules there was no way to identify an 
apparent winner of the 1800 election because neither Jefferson nor 
Burr could claim a clear victory in the electoral college. As a result, 
the election was thrown into the House of Representatives, at which 
point the Federalists almost decided to throw their support to Burr 
so as to prevent Jefferson from being elected.166 In the end, Burr re-
fused to promise that he would govern as a Federalist, and thus the 
 
 164. See PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 36, at 39–41. 
 165. Interestingly, the defeated Federalist Party recognized the dilemma, and one elector 
cast a vote for John Jay, thereby giving John Adams sixty-five votes and Charles Coatesworth 
Pinckney sixty-four votes. Id. at 38–39. 
 166. The Federalists thought Burr a man of dubious character, but they considered Jef-
ferson to be far more dangerous and radical. In the end, however, they determined Burr’s Re-
publicanism to be unshakeable and thereby acceded in Jefferson’s election. 
3ZYW.DOC 3/5/02  8:34 PM 
1573] The Law of Presidential Transitions 
 1629 
Federalist scheme failed and Jefferson was elected.167 
In the 1824 election, four candidates received substantial elec-
toral votes, thereby preventing any of them from receiving an elec-
toral college majority.168 Each candidate was essentially a sectional 
candidate. Andrew Jackson received a plurality of electoral votes (as 
well as the popular votes that were cast), but not a majority, thereby 
throwing the election into Congress. Under the Constitution, the 
top three vote-getters in the electoral college, Jackson, John Quincy 
Adams, and William H. Crawford, could be considered. Henry Clay, 
who finished fourth in the electoral college, threw his support to Ad-
ams, spawning accusations of a corrupt bargain between the two 
men to make Adams President and Clay Secretary of State.169 Clay’s 
support gave Adams twelve of the twenty-four states necessary to 
carry the election in the House; eventually New York threw its sup-
port to Adams as well. After Adams’s victory, Clay was in fact named 
Secretary of State, infuriating the Jacksonians. Again, no apparent 
winner could be ascertained in the 1824 election because identifying 
an electoral college winner when no candidate had a certified major-
ity was impossible. The election finally was decided in the House 
under uncertain conditions. 
The election of 1876 raised yet another set of concerns. Con-
tested against the backdrop of Reconstruction, that election contest 
between Rutherford B. Hayes and Samuel Tilden was riddled with 
chaos and confusion making it difficult to determine who were the 
proper electors from the state of Florida. The day after the election, 
Hayes held a one-vote lead over Tilden in the electoral college. Til-
den, in fact, prevailed in the popular vote by about one-quarter of a 
million votes. Four states submitted double sets of electors, making 
it impossible to even figure out who were the certified electors.170 
 
 167. If the election in the House had been per capita, Burr would have actually defeated 
Jefferson, 53 to 51. But because the Constitution provides for voting by state (one vote per 
state) rather than by Representative, Jefferson eventually prevailed. Nonetheless, it took thirty-
six ballots before Jefferson could gain a clear majority of states in the House. Finally, on Feb-
ruary 17, he was elected by a count of ten states to four. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 36, 
at 40. 
 168. They were John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts, Henry Clay of Kentucky, William 
H. Crawford of Georgia, and Andrew Jackson of Tennessee. See id. at 49. John C. Calhoun of 
South Carolina and De Witt Clinton of New York also had their names put forward but both 
withdrew before the election. Calhoun ran successfully for vice president instead. 
 169. Id. at 50–51. 
 170. See id. at 52–57. 
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South Carolina and Florida each certified two sets of electors, one 
for each candidate. Louisiana, which at the time had two governors 
and two canvassing boards, certified two sets of electors as well. In 
Oregon, one of the victorious Republican electors was a postmaster 
and thus was ineligible under the U.S. Constitution. As a result, the 
Governor certified the top-polling Democratic elector to replace 
him. The ineligible Republican resigned as postmaster and was then 
again elected as an elector. Oregon thus also sent two slates of elec-
tors to Washington. Until the legitimate electors from each of these 
states could be identified, it would have been impossible to name ei-
ther of the candidates as the apparent winner because they held the 
balance in the electoral college. Moreover, the House was under 
Democratic control and the Senate was controlled by Republicans. 
The issue was not resolved until a special commission was formed to 
study and resolve the issue.171 Even then, Tilden backers threatened 
to filibuster the final count until Hayes agreed to withdraw northern 
troops from the South, thereby effectively ending Reconstruction. 
The final result of the election was not announced until 4:00 a.m. on 
March 2, 1877, and Hayes was inaugurated three days later. Clearly 
the uncertainty associated with that election fought out in the 
shadow of Reconstruction is distinguishable from the controversy of 
the 2000 election. 
As these brief summaries indicate, although the 2000 election 
was “close” in a conventional understanding of the term, it was not 
“close” in the same way as the three elections alluded to by Fascell as 
situations where it would be difficult to ascertain an apparent winner 
for purposes of the Act. The 2000 election, by contrast, was compa-
rable to the “close” election of 1960, where the vote was close and 
multiple challenges to the election raised doubts about whether the 
certified electoral victory for Kennedy would hold in the end. Thus, 
even though Fascell expressed concern about the effect of “close” 
elections on the implementation of the Act, the legislative and his-
torical context indicates that Fascell did not consider the 1960 elec-
tion to be a close election for purposes of the Act because an “appar-
ent” winner was readily ascertainable. Moreover, Paul Light observes 
 
 171. It is likely that Tilden would have succeeded in prevailing in the commission, except 
that the tie-breaking voter, Supreme Court Judge David Davis, was disqualified from the 
commission the day before he was appointed because he was elected to the United States Sen-
ate by the Illinois state legislature. This allowed for the appointment of a Republican-leaning 
Justice instead, who cast all tie-breaking votes in Hayes’s favor. Id. at 55–56. 
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that Fascell probably did not include on this list of close elections the 
election of 1888 in which Grover Cleveland won the popular vote 
but lost to Benjamin Harrison in the electoral college, even though 
this would clearly be thought to be “close” in a conventional usage 
of the term.172 Comparing the facts of these “three close such” elec-
tions of 1800, 1824, and 1888, and contrasting them with the elec-
tion of 1960, an election “as close as we would want to have,”173 re-
veals the distinctions from the 2000 election and strongly indicates 
that the Administrator’s definition of a “close” election deviates from 
that of the Act’s sponsors. 
The reference to these three “close” elections also illuminates the 
remainder of Fascell’s observation that if “the administrator had any 
question in his mind, he simply would not make any designation.”174 
Again, it is clear that Fascell is referring to the ability to ascertain 
whether a candidate has a certified electoral college majority. If the 
administrator is unable to make that assessment—such as in the elec-
tions of 1800, 1824, or 1876—then he should refrain from doing so 
“until a decision has been made in the electoral college or in the 
Congress.”175 Thus, this out-of-context statement from the legisla-
tive history fails to support the Administrator’s interpretation of the 
Act. 
The Administrator’s interpretation of these excerpts from the 
Act’s legislative history was thus incorrect. He relied on isolated bits 
of legislative statements uprooted from both their legislative and his-
torical context. When read in context they simply do not support his 
position. Rather, they reinforce the interpretation advocated here,  
 
 172. See Light Testimony, supra note 61. In fact, the elections of 1880, 1884, and 1888 
were all decided by single-state margins. See id. at 57. In 1884 Cleveland won his first term by 
prevailing in the state of New York, a state he carried by only 1,149 votes out of 1,167,169 
cast. Id. at 57. Had Cleveland carried New York in 1888 he would have won that election as 
well. These close elections suggest yet another interesting parallel to the 1960 election. Tradi-
tionally the votes for the Alabama unpledged electors have been credited to Kennedy’s popular 
vote. But as the earlier discussion of the unpledged electors movement indicated, this alloca-
tion is incorrect. A proportional share of Kennedy’s vote should be allocated to Byrd or the 
unpledged electors themselves. If the Alabama popular vote is reallocated according to the 
relative proportions that Byrd and Kennedy drew of the Alabama electors, Kennedy’s popular 
vote in Alabama is reduced (and thus reduced nationwide) by 176,755 votes. Once the na-
tionwide numbers are recalculated, the effect of recognizing these votes for Byrd instead of 
Kennedy is to make Nixon the nationwide popular vote winner by 58,181 votes. Id. at 67. 
 173. 109 CONG. REC. 13,348 (1963)  
 174. Id. at 13,349. 
 175. Id. 
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namely that the Act required the Administrator to recognize Bush as 
the president-elect. 
V. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
A functional analysis of the Act’s policies confirms the conclu-
sions of this essay. First, the purpose of the Act is to provide for an 
orderly and speedy transition of power from one administration to 
the next. Second, the Act designates such transition activities to be 
of a governmental function, and thus provides resources so that the 
expenses are borne by the public, rather than by private individuals. 
Reviewing each of these policies in turn indicates that the transition 
resources should have been released immediately to the Bush-
Cheney transition team and that the Administrator abused his power 
by refusing to do so at that time. 
A. Promoting an Orderly and Speedy Transition 
The primary purpose of the Act is “to promote the orderly trans-
fer of the executive power in connection with the expiration of the 
term of office of a President and the inauguration of a new Presi-
dent.”176 The Act arose from a bipartisan study conducted during the 
Kennedy administration, which recognized the importance of an or-
derly transition period that would ensure that the new administration 
could “hit the ground running” and be ready to govern from the 
first day in office.177 The Act states: 
The national interest requires that such transitions in the office of 
President be accomplished so as to assure continuity in the faithful 
execution of the laws and in the conduct of the affairs of the Fed-
eral Government, both domestic and foreign. Any disruption occa-
sioned by the transfer of the executive power could produce results 
detrimental to the safety and well-being of the United States and its 
people. Accordingly, it is the intent of the Congress that appropri-
ate actions be authorized and taken to avoid or minimize any dis-
ruption.178 
Disruption or delay in effectuating a transfer of power to the ap-
 
 176. Presidential Transition Act, supra note 1, § 2. 
 177. See Smith, supra note 4, at CRS-9. 
 178. Presidential Transition Act, supra note 1, § 2 (emphasis added). 
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parent successful candidates would threaten the national interest. A 
failure to provide adequate resources to enable a smooth and speedy 
transition during the short period between the general election and 
the inauguration substantially handicaps a new President’s ability to 
govern and pursue policy objectives during the first year of his term. 
As John Sununu, former Chief of Staff to President Bush, testified to 
Congress in early December, “A one-month delay now will be re-
flected in a six-month or one-year delay in getting things really 
started.”179 Indeed, news reports in November and December of 
2000 indicated that this concern helped to produce economic jitters 
that eventually blossomed into a recession. The failed nomination of 
Linda Chavez to serve as Secretary of the Department of Labor was 
also attributed in part to the shortened transition period and the in-
ability to fully investigate her background. Other news stories raised 
concerns about the effect of the election uncertainty on foreign af-
fairs and military obligations. It is exactly this sort of national harm 
and loss of public confidence that the Act seeks to avoid through its 
early identification of a President-elect and its provisions for a 
smooth transition. 
This policy also explains the Act’s decision to allow the release of 
transition resources to the “apparent” successful candidate, rather 
than awaiting an official announcement of a winner. Congress’s fears 
are a one-way street—the country will undoubtedly be harmed by 
delay in releasing the transition resources, but there will be minimal 
harm from releasing the resources to the apparent successful candi-
date. Money can be replaced; time cannot. Given the brief period of 
time between the election and the inauguration, every day is crucial. 
Thus, it is equally crucial that transition resources be made available 
as soon as an apparent successful candidate is identified. Congress 
recognized delaying the transition would create irremediable harm to 
the country. This delay is even more damaging when the apparent 
successful candidate is from the non-incumbent political party, 
thereby making it impossible to maintain continuity by retaining the 
incumbent President’s officials and priorities. As the sitting Vice 
President, Al Gore retained all of the resources of office to effectuate 
his transition, including offices, a residence, and staff.180 In addition, 
 
 179. Michael M. Phillips, Election 2000: GSA Says Presidential Victor Isn’t Clear, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 5, 2000, at A14, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 26618876. 
 180. See Editorial, supra note 3. As the New York Times reported on November 28, 
2000: 
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the Act appropriates money to outgoing Vice-Presidents. 
In contrast to the substantial harm caused by a delay in releasing 
the funds, releasing the funds prematurely will have little countervail-
ing harm, even if it turns out that the apparent winner is not the ac-
tual winner. It will not change the identity of the eventual official 
winning candidate. From a purely financial perspective, one would 
expect that many of the expenses associated with setting up a transi-
tion office would be incurred regardless of the candidate who pre-
vailed, meaning that many expenses themselves will not be wasted. A 
prompt release of transition resources to the apparent successful can-
didates, Bush and Cheney, is the only understanding of the Adminis-
trator’s duties that is consistent with the policy goals of the Act. 
The need for quick action also rebuts the Administrator’s belief 
that he should wait for a concession or resolution of litigation before 
declaring an apparent winner. First, relying on these factors inher-
ently creates substantial delay and uncertainty, undermining the 
speediness and effectiveness of the transition. Second, these factors 
open the door to politically-motivated delay in declaring an apparent 
winner, as happened during the 2000 election.181 Finally, because of 
the vagueness and subjectiveness of these factors and the absence of 
any effective mechanism for review—i.e., how much certainty is 
enough?—they are prone to easy manipulation, making it difficult to 
constrain the Administrator from making wholly partisan judgments. 
It is possible that the candidate initially identified as the apparent 
winner may later have to yield that designation to a different candi-
date sometime between election day and the inauguration, but this 
eventuality would have little negative impact on the policies animat-
ing the Act. While some of the money allocated for the transition 
will have been spent, many of the expenses of the transition will have 
been incurred regardless of which candidate spent the funds, such as 
expenses for heat, plumbing, office supplies, support staff, office 
 
 
Until January 20 [Gore] has plenty of office space in the Old Executive Office 
Building, across the street from the White House, an office in the West Wing; a spa-
cious Vice Presidential residence at the Naval Observatory, where he and his aides 
have been mapping their strategy. Moreover, Mr. Gore has access to daily intelli-
gence briefings and aides who are already cleared to receive classified material. 
Fred Thompson, Editorial, Hand over the Keys: Transition Needs to Begin, WASH. TIMES, 
Dec. 5, 2000, at A17, available at 2000 WL 4171290 (citing N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2000). 
 181. See supra notes 77–86 and accompanying text (describing political pressures placed 
on the Administrator). 
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equipment, moving expenses and the like. The transition period for 
the new President-elect would have been shortened as well, but this 
would also be the case if as during the 2000 election, the Adminis-
trator refuses to recognize either candidate as the apparent winner. 
Thus, a reversal in identifying the apparent winner will have little 
negative effect on the policies of the Act, and certainly far less effect 
than a decision to delay the decision as occurred in this case. 
A problem with the Act is that it makes no express provision for 
what happens if the Administrator recognizes the apparent winning 
candidate only to have this candidate later turn out not to be the ac-
tual winning candidate. However, the failure to make provision for 
what happens in this situation does not justify a refusal to follow the 
requirements of the Act to pay out the money in a timely manner. 
B. The Need for Integrity and Public Confidence 
The history of the Act indicates a second policy goal that sug-
gests the need for a prompt release of transition resources and thus a 
swift recognition of an apparent winner. Prior to the Act, transitions 
were funded by the political parties and by private donors. An ex-
press purpose of the Act was to replace that system with a system of 
government-supported presidential transitions. Congress clearly un-
derstood the transition to a new administration to be of a govern-
mental or quasi-government nature, which should be funded by the 
federal government, rather than by political parties or private do-
nors.182 Equally important, the sponsors of the Act believed that pri-
vate financing of transitions raised the perception of special interest 
influence over the transition process, providing some interests with 
undue influence even as the new administration established policies 
and priorities. As Congressman Rosenthal observed on the floor of 
the House, “If someone is going to come forward and help pay what 
we now recognize is a cost of government, which is actually what it 
is, during the transitional period, that person may feel inclined to 
think that he is entitled to special consideration from the govern-
ment.”183 One purpose of the Act was to allay these fears: 
[W]e should here and now say by the passing of this bill . . . that 
from now on the government will assume its responsibility and 
 
 182. See 109 CONG. REC. 13,346 (1963) (statement of Mr. Rosenthal); id. at 13,347 
(statement of Mr. Monagan). 
 183. Id. at 13,346. 
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shall pay the cost for the orderly transition of government. If we do 
this . . . we can prevent any special group or any special interests 
from anxiously coming forward to help pay government expense. 
 . . . [I]t is my opinion that this is the most significant reason, 
and I think a singular and important reason why this bill should be 
enacted.184 
Congressman Fascell expressed these goals even more forcefully: 
I think the political climate can be very, very much improved by 
not having the President-elect and the Vice-President-elect of these 
United States calling on his friends and others who might be inter-
ested to pay the costs of him assuming office in this, the greatest 
country in the world. It just does not seem proper and necessary to 
have them going around begging for money to pay for the cost of 
what ought to be legitimate costs of Government . . . .185 
The Act plainly intends to relieve an incoming administration 
from being saddled with a choice between having to beg for money 
from private individuals on the one hand and seeing their transition 
undermined by lack of resources on the other. In fact, news reports 
at the time indicated that the Bush-Cheney transition team con-
fronted that choice. Unable to gain access to the funds designated by 
the federal government to effectuate a transition, the Bush-Cheney 
transition team was forced to turn to private donors for money to 
fund their transition. It appears that in so doing they complied punc-
tiliously with all ethical and legal rules governing the acceptance of 
such contributions.186 
Despite their efforts to prevent actual conflicts of interest, there 
are additional problems that are simply inherent in being forced to 
rely solely on private funding of transitions, and for which such safe-
guards will be unavailing. The drafters of the Act were concerned 
about the perception of impropriety occasioned by the reliance on 
private funds for a transition as well as believing that it is simply im-
proper to require private financing of a public governmental func-
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 13,348. 
 186. It should be noted that the Bush-Cheney team took substantial steps to negate the 
concerns expressed by the authors of the Act. For instance, they prohibited corporations from 
contributing and limited contributions to $5,000 per donor. There seems to be no question 
that they complied with all ethical and legal rules governing the acceptance of contributions for 
transition purposes. 
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tion. These concerns of perception and unfairness are inherent in re-
lying solely on private financing of transitions, which is exactly why 
the Act provides governmental funding of transition efforts. Thus, 
again, the policies of the Act compel the conclusion that the funds 
should have been released to the Bush-Cheney transition team as 
soon as they became the apparent successful candidates so that they 
could effectuate their transition appropriately. 
It is evident that the policies animating the Act—the need for a 
smooth and speedy transition untainted by special-interest influ-
ence—would be satisfied only by releasing transition resources as 
soon as a candidate can be identified as having earned a majority of 
electoral votes. This suggests that if the Administrator has discretion 
under the Act, the policies of the Act indicate that it is appropriate to 
err on the side of releasing the funds too early rather than too late. 
VI. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
The problems that arose with the Presidential Transition Act 
during the 2000 election were primarily the result of lawless action 
by the GSA Administrator in refusing to abide by the plain language 
and congressional intent of the Act, as well as political pressures im-
posed by the White House seeking to gain an advantage for Al Gore 
and to frustrate the Bush-Cheney transition. Regardless of the rea-
sons for his lawless and obstinate behavior, by refusing to abide by 
the law, the Administrator substantially prejudiced the Bush transi-
tion efforts, forcing them to rely exclusively on private fund-raising 
for several weeks and substantially reducing the time they had to co-
ordinate their transition efforts. In light of the costs that this one 
mid-level bureaucrat was able to impose on the country during the 
2000 election, it is appropriate to consider whether Congress should 
amend the Act. 
In considering amendments to the Act, it should be recognized 
that the problems that happened during the 2000 election resulted 
not from any defects in the Act itself, but resulted from the lawless 
and irresponsible behavior of the GSA Administrator in refusing to 
carry out the Act’s mandate. The Act is plain on its face and context 
eliminates any possible ambiguity. Once Bush claimed a certified ma-
jority of electoral votes, he should have been declared the President-
elect and been tendered the transition resources. Given the implausi-
bility of a Gore victory at that point, on the facts of the situation 
there was no reasonable basis for withholding the transition re-
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sources from Bush. Unfortunately, the act provides no mechanism 
for an aggrieved party to force the Administrator to carry out his 
statutory duties under the Act, and certainly no mechanism that 
could be effective within the short time limits of the transition pe-
riod. 
To prevent this opportunism in the future, the Act could be 
amended to define the term “apparent successful candidate” to make 
explicit what is already implicit in the Act, namely that the apparent 
winner should be declared as soon as one candidate has a majority of 
certified and pledged electors. It is not clear that this would be an 
improvement over the current law (correctly implemented, of 
course). Substituting this language might imply that this is the exclu-
sive way of ascertaining the apparent winner. One could imagine 
scenarios where the apparent winner could be easily ascertained, even 
if he lacks an electoral college majority. Nonetheless, the Administra-
tor’s lawless actions in the 2000 election are likely to be cited by fu-
ture Administrators confronted with similar situations. Thus, the 
need to reclarify the statute may be sufficiently pressing to necessitate 
explicit language regarding the legal relevance of an electoral college 
majority. 
The Act should also be amended to provide for the situation 
where the apparent winner does not turn out to be the actual winner 
in the end. Election contests rarely overturn the initial, certified win-
ner. Nonetheless if this were to happen in a particular presidential 
election, additional money should be appropriated to the final appar-
ent winner if the identity of the apparent winner changes before the 
election results are final. 
Where the outcome is sufficiently in doubt, Congress could also 
provide that transition funds could be released to both candidates 
pending final resolution of the outcome of the case. This option is 
not available under current law because the Act permits payment to 
only one candidate (the apparent winner) and gives the Administra-
tor no discretion to release funds to a candidate who is not the ap-
parent winner, even though that candidate might later turn out to be 
the actual winner of the election. 
If Congress wants to amend the statute to make the determina-
tion of an apparent winner more of a matter of discretion of a gov-
ernment official, then the Administrator of the GSA is not the ap-
propriate party to make this determination. At the very least the 
power to ascertain an apparent winner should be vested in a more 
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senior official, preferably one with some degree of expertise to make 
such a determination, such as the Attorney General. Under current 
law, the utter absurdity of vesting this power in an official of such 
minor standing and so unsuited to make the determination indicates 
that Congress did not intend for it to be anything other than a rou-
tine decision governed by a bright-line rule. If Congress intends for 
the decision to be more difficult or discretionary than current law 
implies, then it should vest the power in a more suitable official. 
Although an improvement over the current regime, the Attorney 
General is still a political appointee; thus this solution would not 
wholly eliminate the political influences that noticeably influenced 
the Administrator’s decision. If Congress pursues this course, it may 
be more appropriate to create an independent commission to make 
the determination of when an apparent winner can be identified.187 
This might insulate such a commission from some more blatant 
forms of partisan influence but would still be inferior to a bright-line 
statutory command that removed the possibility of politically-
motivated decision making. 
Because any of these solutions would leave the potential for arbi-
trary or politically-motivated action, Congress should also allow for 
the expedited appeal to federal court of any decision made under the 
Act by a party who unsuccessfully requests a release of the transition 
resources. Alternatively, Congress could limit the trigger for review 
to a request by a party who has attained a majority of certified and 
pledged presidential electors. Limiting the opportunity for review to 
this more narrow class of cases would head off premature or strategic 
requests for access to the transition resources while maintaining the 
Act’s current focus on the accomplishment of an electoral college 
majority as the crucial basis for determining the apparent winner. 
Regardless of what Congress chooses to do, it is crucial that it do 
something to prevent a disastrous recurrence of the 2000 election 
where one minor ministerial officer of the executive branch claimed 
the authority to withhold the transition resources for well over a 
month, thereby slicing the President-elect’s transition time in half. 
Not only did this power grab lack any legal basis, but it was exercised 
in an arbitrary and politically-motivated way. In so doing, it preju-
diced the presidential transition and created the exact the problems 
that the Act was intended to alleviate, such as delaying the transition 
 
 187. I offer no suggestions as to how such a commission might be composed. 
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and forcing a reliance solely on private fundraising. Congress must 
do something to ensure that such a situation never materializes 
again. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The presidential election of 2000 raised a number of unprece-
dented legal issues. Many of those issues were evanescent and are 
unlikely to arise in the future, even in an election as close and con-
tentious as this one. The problem of the interpretation and admini-
stration of the Presidential Transition Act, however, is almost certain 
to arise again. The ability of the incumbent administration to ma-
nipulate the Act for political purpose and to thereby undermine the 
transition efforts of a rival party is certain to tempt future administra-
tions. The Act originally intended that the determination of a Presi-
dent-elect be a relatively simply matter, one to be ascertained solely 
by examining whether one candidate had earned an electoral college 
majority. As the sponsor of the Act observed, the 1960 election—
one at least as close, contentious, and uncertain as the 2000 elec-
tion—presented no problems in ascertaining an apparent winner. 
Nonetheless, the Administrator of GSA, inspired in large part by po-
litical pressures emanating from the White House, refused to recog-
nize an apparent winner until after the Supreme Court ruled in favor 
of George Bush and after Al Gore conceded the election. In so do-
ing, the Administrator violated the Act’s language and intent and 
undermined its policies as well, harming the Bush transition and the 
country as a whole in the process. 
Although the Administrator’s actions clearly violated the Act, the 
Bush-Cheney transition team had little recourse to rectify the viola-
tion. My hope is that this article will provide an authoritative inter-
pretation of the Act, its history, and policies, and useful suggestions 
for reform to avoid similar problems in the future. 
 
